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A REPORT ON THE 1989 PRISON DISTURBANCES AND RIOTS
AT STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS AT
GRATERFORD, HUNTINGDON, ROCKVIEW, and CAMP HILL

PRESENTED BY

THE PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
THOMAS R. CALTAGIRONE, CHAIRMAN

NOVEMBER 19, 1990

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I. Introduction

On November 14, 1989, the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania adopted House Resolution No. 226. Referencing the fact that prison "riots" had occurred at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon on October 23, 1989; at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill from October 25, 1989 through October 28, 1989; at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford on November 1, 1989; and at the State Correctional Institution at Rockview on February 7, 1989, the Resolution directed the Judiciary Committee to study and investigate all aspects of these riots.

Among other issues raised in HR 226 were directions to the Committee to consider ways of reducing the number of injuries sustained by corrections officers, other corrections personnel, state and local personnel, and emergency personnel who were involved in resolving the aforementioned disturbances. The Resolution further directed that several issues relating specifically to the Camp Hill disturbances be investigated, including the manner in which the second riot occurred when the institution was in a "lockdown" status, the adequacy of protection for neighboring communities during the course of the riots, and the causes and cost of the riots. The Resolution further specifically directed a review of prison overcrowding in the state correctional system.

Prior to the passage of HR 226, the House Judiciary

Committee had been involved in formulating legislative responses to a number of the issues raised in HR 226, in particular the problem of state-wide prison overcrowding. On May 9, 1989, the Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crimes and Corrections had conducted a public meeting with the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, David S. Owens, to review the status of the state correctional system and attempt to formulate needed legislative initiatives. On July 17, 1989, the Judiciary Committee conducted a public hearing into the issue of prison overcrowding, considering a number of pieces of legislation designed to address that problem.

On November 9, 1989, shortly after the occurrence of the disturbances at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, members of the Judiciary Committee met informally with Commissioner Owens and various Department of Corrections personnel to review the status of the Camp Hill Institution. On November 15, 1989, Committee members and staff were given a complete tour of the Camp Hill facility by Department personnel, including Commissioner Owens. Committee members were provided with an opportunity to review the circumstances under which the riots had occurred, and assess the nature of, and damage to, the physical plant.

Pursuant to HR 226, the Judiciary Committee conducted public hearings on January 16, January 17, March 7, and May 31, 1990. Among the witnesses appearing before the Committee were Commissioner Owens, the commissioner of the Pennsylvania State

Police, the superintendent and deputy superintendents of the SCI at Camp Hill, the state police officers in charge during the disturbances at Camp Hill, the director of the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA), representatives of the Cumberland County Office of Emergency Preparedness, various correctional officers and commissioned officers from the SCI at Camp Hill, the executive directors of the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD) and the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, and Department of Corrections Commissioner Joseph D. Lehman. In addition, the Committee received written reports from the superintendents of the SCI's at Graterford, Rockview, and Huntingdon, copies of which are attached to this report.

The Committee received the cooperation of the Department of Corrections in obtaining the information necessary to conduct its investigation, including an opportunity for Committee members and staff to review the specific emergency response plans for the SCI at Camp Hill, and the statewide plans for the Department of Corrections. The Committee was also provided full access to the transcripts, documents, photographs, and other evidence accumulated by the Governor's Commission to Investigate Disturbances at Camp Hill Correctional Institution.

II. Chronology

On February 7, 1989, a major disturbance occurred at the SCI at Rockview. The disturbance began at approximately 2:05 P.M. At a point shortly after 5:00 P.M., the incident was terminated and the inmates were locked down. The institution returned to a normal schedule the next morning. Nineteen staff members and six inmates were injured in this disturbance.

On October 23, 1989, a major disturbance occurred at the SCI at Huntingdon. The disturbance began at approximately 5:45 P.M., and by 10:30 P.M., the involved cell block was secure and all inmates were accounted for. Approximately one-hundred inmates participated in the disturbance to some degree. Forty-four Corrections employees and twenty-two inmates were treated for injuries. Total property damage amounted to over \$73,000.

On October 25, 1989, a major disturbance occurred at the SCI at Camp Hill, beginning at approximately 2:45 P.M. By approximately 11:00 P.M. on October 25, the institution was apparently secure and the disturbance terminated, although the lock down process was not completed until approximately 3:00 A.M. on October 26. Thirty-five Corrections employees and nine inmates had been injured, while twelve Corrections employees had been held as hostages and thirty-one other employees had been trapped in various places throughout the institution. The commissary, furniture factory office complex, and several other facilities had been destroyed by fire. Many of the cell blocks

throughout the institution suffered extensive damage.

On October 26, 1989, at approximately 6:00 P.M., a second major disturbance commenced at the SCI at Camp Hill. Pennsylvania State Police and Corrections personnel regained control of the institution by approximately 8:00 A.M. on October 27, 1989. Thirty-four Corrections employees and thirty-two inmates were injured in this second riot. Five Corrections employees had been taken as hostages. Much of the institution was destroyed.

On October 30, 1989, the Governor established the Governor's Commission to Investigate Disturbances at Camp Hill Correctional Institution. The Commission consisted of three members, and was directed to review the events of October 25, 26 and 27, 1989, at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill. The Commission was further directed to submit its findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Governor no later than December 1, 1989. This deadline was subsequently extended to December 21, 1989.

On November 1, 1989, a disturbance occurred at the SCI at Graterford. The incident began at approximately 9:00 A.M., and by 9:45 A.M., all of the inmates in the involved cell block were secured in their cells and the block was locked down. Six correctional officers and one inmate were injured. No property damages occurred.

On November 1, 1989, Robert M. Freeman, Superintendent of the SCI at Camp Hill, was suspended without pay by Commissioner Owens.

On December 21, 1989, the Governor's Commission to Investigate Disturbances at Camp Hill Correctional Institution issued its final report. This report contained a thorough review of the disturbances at Camp Hill, along with analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. On December 22, 1989, a special investigative committee formed within the Department of Corrections submitted to the Governor a report on the disturbances at the SCI at Camp Hill, including an analysis of the disturbance and a series of recommendations.

On January 26, 1990, Governor Casey recommended to Commissioner Owens that Superintendent Freeman and Richard C. Smith, Deputy Superintendent for Operations at Camp Hill, be dismissed from the service of the Department of Corrections. The Governor indicated that this recommendation for dismissal would have included John R. Stover, Captain of the Guards at Camp Hill, but that Captain Stover had earlier retired. The Governor further recommended that Terry W. Henry, Deputy Superintendent for Treatment at Camp Hill, be transferred to another correctional facility. The Governor indicated that his recommendations were based upon the findings of the Adams Commission, and his own review of the occurrences. These recommended personnel actions were subsequently carried out by Commissioner Owens.

On February 20, 1990, Commissioner Owens resigned from his position, following a dispute as to whether Commissioner Owens had inappropriately withheld from the Governor's Commission certain internal Department of Corrections memorandum relating to the Camp Hill disturbances. Deputy Commisisoner Erskind DeRamus was named as Acting Commissioner of the Department. On April 18, 1990, Joseph D. Lehman was named by the Governor as his choice to become Commissioner of the Department of Corrections, and he assumed control of the operations of the Department at that time. He was subsequently nominated by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate as Commissioner.

III. Discussion

HR 226 directs the Judiciary Committee to study and investigate the causes of the riots at the SCI's at Camp Hill, Huntingdon, Graterford, and Rockview. Upon a review of all the evidence available to the Committee, there is no question but that the primary "cause" of the aforementioned riots was that various inmates, incarcerated in these institutions, specifically and intentionally chose to instigate or participate in these disturbances. That certain inmates should choose to engage in this type of behavior should hardly be surprising; the inmates at these institutions are incarcerated because they have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of previous actions constituting criminal, antisocial, and often violent behavior. Such behavior will not terminate simply because a convicted criminal is incarcerated.

In contrast, the evidence is clear that substantial numbers of inmates at each of the correctional institutions were placed in a position to participate fully in these riots, but chose not to do so. In the Camp Hill incidents, there were instances of inmates assisting guards, and escorting them to safety. Inmates housed in the Group I modular housing units at Camp Hill, where they participated in an intensive drug treatment program, clothed correctional officers in inmate clothing to disguise their identity, doused the floors of their units with water to prevent them from burning, and successfully defended their modular housing unit from other rampaging inmates.

While the incidents at the correctional institutions at Huntingdon, Graterford, and Rockview were contained and resolved with relatively minimal personal injury or property damage, the initial incident at Camp Hill burgeoned into a riot which involved a great deal of the institution. After this first riot was apparently quelled, a second riot erupted which consumed the entire institution.

Both the Governor's Commission to Investigate Disturbances at Camp Hill Correctional Institution and the Special Investigative Committee formed within the Department of Corrections have extensively chronicled the conditions existing at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill in October of 1989, and the specific occurrences of October 25, 26, and 27, 1989. Their analysis and recommendations are accurate and appropriate, and endorsed by this Committee. While no purpose would be served in reiterating the contents of these reports, the specific requirements of H.R. 226, particularly in reference to the causes of the second riot at Camp Hill and the impact of overcrowding on the state correctional system, require that certain areas be discussed and emphasized in this report.

The Camp Hill facility was constructed during the years from 1938 to 1940 for the purpose of housing juvenile offenders between 15 and 18 years of age. Throughout most of its history, Camp Hill functioned in this capacity. In 1975, the Attorney General terminated the use of the facility for juvenile commitments, and there began a process of incarcerating

progressively more serious offenders at the institution. In 1986, following a substantial number of escapes from the institution, a second perimeter fence was installed. In 1989, a fence detection system was added. The result of these changes was a facility with a maximum security exterior, but with cell blocks and other interior facilities designed and constructed in the 1930's for housing juveniles.

While the exterior walls of the cell blocks were of solid masonry construction, the interior walls between cell blocks, and from the cell blocks into the areas containing the plumbing runs, were constructed of a hollow structural tile. Any inmate with a tool such as a hammer could easily break through these walls.

The cables which operated individual cell locking devices ran above the cell doors, throughout the length of the cell blocks. These cables were covered by metal panels, many of which were removed by inmates during the first disturbance on October 25. If these panels were not in place, any inmate could access the cables, and unlock cell doors. In addition, apparently as a carryover from the tradesman training which occurred when the facility housed juveniles, inmate crews performed repair services on the locking mechanisms. Because the mechanisms were so old, they required frequent repair, and parts generally had to be fabricated in the prison machine shop. Thus the vulnerability of the cell locking system seemed to be general knowledge within the institution.

In addition to the deficiencies of the interior cell walls and the locking devices, Camp Hill contained modular housing units of a wooden frame construction, which were particularly susceptible to fire. Over the course of the years, air conditioners had been installed in openings in the exterior walls of almost all the buildings within the perimeter fence at Camp Hill, other than the cell blocks. The removal of these air conditioner units provided easy access for inmates into these buildings. In particular, the control center for the institution, was vulnerable to inmate assault for this reason. Also, the interior fencing within the institution did not provide a substantial restraint to rampaging inmates.

Aggravating the conditions at Camp Hill was the manner in which the institution was administered. While the Committee is not in a position to make personnel decisions for the Department of Corrections, there is no question but that the overall administration of the Camp Hill facility contributed substantially to the severity of the incidents which occurred.

The record is clear that for a considerable number of years, Camp Hill had experienced substantial problems in the activities and discipline of correctional officers. The commissioned officers and the correctional officers were split into contending factions, the Major of the Guard had essentially been removed from a substantial role in administering the institution, no communication or cooperation whatsoever existed between the commissioned officers and the deputy superintendents, and the

superintendent of the institution was isolated, aloof, and removed from the day-to-day decision-making process.

Aggravating these circumstances was the overall institutional climate. As a result of statewide overcrowding, the Camp Hill institution had progressively become an institution where maximum custody inmates were housed. Equally important, a shortage of programming resulted in extensive idle time among the inmate population. A series of policy changes concerning inmate activities, particularly relating to sick call and visitation, and the manner in which these changes were implemented, had contributed to heightened tension among the inmates. In addition, a paramilitary inmate organization had experienced at least some success in organizing within the institution.

As discussed by the Governor's Commission, an immediate show of force at the E Gate of the Camp Hill institution on the first day of rioting might well have contained the scope and severity of the first day's riot. Such a response did not occur, and the rioting inmates eventually broke through E Gate and gained control of a major part of the institution. Retaking control of the institution required a substantial State Police contingent, as well as a large number of local police units, which provided security for the perimeter of the institution.

By approximately 11:00 P.M. on October 25, 1989, the Camp Hill Correctional Institution was apparently secure, although the lockdown process continued until approximately 3:00 A.M. on

October 26.

On October 26th, the administrative deficiencies, physical plant conditions, and climate of the institution became key contributors to the occurrence and scope of the second Camp Hill riot. When an institution is in a secure, lock down status, it is extremely unlikely that a major disturbance will occur, simply because all inmates are locked in cells. On October 26, 1989, the Camp Hill institution was supposedly secure and locked down; in reality, the institution was not secured in the least. The condition of the cell walls and the locking mechanisms enabled many inmates to leave their cells. Switchbox rooms were not secure, which enabled inmates leaving their cells to easily free all other inmates in a cell block. The E Gate in the institution had not been repaired. When many inmates acted in concert in leaving their cells on the evening of October 26th, it was a simple matter to overpower guards, open all cells in any given cell block, and gain access to the entire institution.

The obvious question is why the institution was not secured after the first riot. There appeared to be a general feeling among the commissioned officers and among the superintendent and the deputies that the riot was over, and they were simply in a stage of gradually resuming normal operations. While this may have been true, it can not be accepted as an excuse.

The commissioned officers have been intent upon blaming the former superintendent and the deputies for the second day's riot,

claiming that they notified the deputies of the security problems in the cell blocks, but that nothing was done. The former superintendent and the deputies have been equally intent in blaming the commissioned officers, claiming that they were never apprised of the security problems in the cell blocks. In fact, the deputies produced an audio tape in which the security captain reported that the cell blocks were secured.

Notwithstanding the claims of both groups, there is no excuse for the second day's riot; both groups are fully to blame. While Correctional Officer I's and sergeants were sent out to man insecure cell blocks populated by inmates who had gone on an incredibly destructive rampage just hours before, the commissioned officers and the superintendent and his deputies made no effort to undertake a systematic review of the security of the institution, the extent of the damage, or the safety of the correctional officers. Yet these persons had sufficient time to gather for a telephone conversation with the Governor, and to watch films of the previous day's rioting. Incredibly, the maintenance crew at the prison was sent home early on October 26th.

In suspending Superintendent Freeman, Commissioner Owens cited the superintendent's decision to stand down the State Police contingent on October 26th, and his failure to pursue an immediate shakedown of the institution. In retrospect, these decisions were clearly erroneous, but were not the true problem. A vertical command structure in which some levels are barely on

speaking terms with other levels impedes communications, and will inevitably lead to erroneous decisions.

Also at issue in the review of the Camp Hill disturbances has been the role of Commissioner Owens and the departmental administrative staff. Specifically, the question is whether the Commissioner and his staff should have been more actively involved in responding to, and managing, the disturbances at Camp Hill. This is not a simple question to answer. Obviously, with correctional institutions disbursed throughout the Commonwealth, the primary responsibility for response and management in any disturbance rests with the superintendent of the institution. The incidents at Huntingdon, Graterford and Rockview were all handled successfully at the institution level. These responses were made in consultation with the Commissioner's office.

Throughout both disturbances at Camp Hill, Commissioner Owens individually had contact with Superintendent Freeman. However, the Department's contingency plan, which calls for the establishment of a central office command post, was never activated. This same plan also provides for the option of a more direct, on-site role by central office personnel.

On October 26th, many of the correctional officers and administrators at Camp Hill were in a state of extreme exhaustion. Considering the events of the previous 24 hours, this is understandable. This exhaustion undoubtedly contributed to the failure to assess, and respond to, the security situation

within the institution in an adequate manner. The presence of fresh administrative personnel to provide assistance and a "second opinion" might well have lessened this failure. This capacity should have been provided by the central office command post, but was not.

Once substantial portions of the institution at Camp Hill were under the control of rioting inmates, primary responsibility for an armed response to retake control of the institution fell upon the Pennsylvania State Police, with assistance from corrections personnel. This arrangement is pursuant to interdepartmental agreements between the State Police and the Department of Corrections. After both riots, the State Police were able to retake control of the institution with no loss of life. The actions of the State Police and corrections personnel in gaining the release of the hostages and control of the institution with no loss of life were admirable, and merit the commendation and appreciation of the members of the Committee, and all the citizens of the Commonwealth.

While the armed response of the State Police worked well once the State Police were on the scene and authorized to enter the Camp Hill institution, there were two specific instances where the logistics of a forceful response were inadequate, and contributed to the creation of substantial danger to Corrections personnel. The first instance was the failure of the administration at Camp Hill to respond with a substantial show of force at E Gate on October 25th. The second was the failure to

organize an immediate armed response on October 26th to rescue those Corrections personnel trapped in the control center, and the subsequent delay in authorizing the State Police contingent to enter the prison. These instances were indicative of a lack of capacity throughout the system for an immediate show of armed force by institution personnel. There appeared to be no capability at the individual correctional institutions for a timely and adequate show of force, other than a squad of officers with batons. A response capability which includes immediate show of force, at each correctional institution, could well prevent the escalation of a disturbance into a major riot, needlessly endangering life and property.

During the two disturbances at Camp Hill, security around the perimeter of the institution was provided primarily by local police departments. Medical and emergency services were also provided by the local municipalities, through municipal employees or volunteer organizations. These individuals performed in an exceptional manner through three long and difficult days, and also deserve the commendation and appreciation of the members of the Committee and the citizens of the Commonwealth. Because of the immediate response by local police departments, and their dedicated service in guarding the perimeter of Camp Hill throughout both disturbances, the public was fully protected during the course of this incident.

The Committee also recognizes the difficulties experienced by local police, firefighters, and medical and emergency response

personnel in coordinating and carrying out their assignments. The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) and the Cumberland County Office of Emergency Preparedness emphasized the difficulty caused by the lack of coordination of state and local emergency services in the response plan for the Camp Hill institution. Additionally, the testimony reflected deficiencies in training and drills. The preparation of emergency response plans for each correctional institution throughout the Commonwealth, and the coordination of these activities with state and local emergency response personnel, is essential for the protection of the citizens of the Commonwealth.

IV. Overcrowding

HR 226 specifically references prison overcrowding as a factor which might have had a bearing on the riots under consideration. It is no secret that Pennsylvania's prisons, at both the state and county levels, are seriously overcrowded, and this overcrowding continues to worsen. Recent projections from the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency indicate that the state inmate population could reach 32,000 by 1995. County prison populations also continue to rise markedly.

There is no question but that prison overcrowding in the state prison system contributed directly and substantially to the severity of the disturbances at Camp Hill. When overcrowding makes the location of bed and cell space the number one priority of prison administration, security, public protection, and guard safety all take a back seat. The size of the state-wide inmate population mandated that the cell blocks at Camp Hill be utilized for the incarceration of serious offenders, regardless of their appropriateness for that purpose. Overcrowding undoubtedly contributed also to the tense institutional climate, and the administrative failings among department personnel. Overcrowded prisons are obviously very difficult places for all persons inside the fence, including correctional officers, other department personnel, and inmates. When overcrowding increases stress levels and contributes to idle time among inmates, the difficulty and danger for correctional officers and other personnel clearly increases.

The problems of overcrowding, and possible strategies to address these problems, are hardly new or novel. In 1985, the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency issued a report entitled, "A Strategy to Alleviate Overcrowding in Pennsylvania's Prisons and Jails." In 1987, the Governor's Interdepartmental Task Force on Corrections issued a report which emphasized the overcrowding problem, and endorsed many of the same recommendations as enunciated in the 1985 PCCD report. In 1988, the Legislative Budget and Finance Committee issued a report which again emphasized the overcrowding problem and recommended strategies to address the problem. In 1990, the PCCD has issued another report on the problem of prison overcrowding.

Despite an apparent consensus among the experts charged with evaluating the overcrowding in the Pennsylvania state prison system, the situation continues to worsen while most recommended responses fail to be implemented. Since 1987, well over 3,000 cells have been added to the state system through the construction of five new correctional facilities and the expansion of existing facilities. Plans in progress call for the addition of over 8,000 cells to the existing 13,700 state cells, through the construction of four new prisons, and the further expansion of cell space at existing facilities. The recent approval by the voters of the Commonwealth of a \$200 million state bond program to assist in the financing of county prison construction will contribute to a substantial expansion of county prison cell space.

The addition of the aforementioned cell space is necessary for the protection of the citizens of the Commonwealth, and is endorsed by the Committee. Unfortunately, the construction of the aforementioned additional cell space will not solve the prison overcrowding problem in Pennsylvania. The growth of prison population will continue to outstrip the expansion in cell capacity, leading to a continually worsening situation.

As indicated in all the reports which have studied this problem, additional steps must be taken to manage the inmate population in a more effective manner, and assure that those inmates whose incarceration is necessary for the protection of the public are in fact confined, and in secure facilities. The potential alternative is for our state correctional institutions to be controlled by federal courts, which show little concern for public safety.

Changes in the parole system, intermediate punishments, earned time, boot camps, and drug and alcohol treatment are all responses which have been raised repeatedly by those persons directly involved in the corrections system as necessary resources to handle the current prison population. This Committee has addressed many of these issues legislatively, and has indicated a willingness to deal constructively with others. Unfortunately, this committment alone is not sufficient to address the problem.

The Department of Corrections is an administrative, cabinet

level agency; an effective response to its problems requires commitment, initiative and leadership from the Executive Branch of government. The Executive Branch failed to provide these ingredients prior to the Camp Hill disturbances.

Subsequent to Camp Hill, the administration has supported substantial expansion of cell capacity in the state system, along with expansion at the county level. Additionally, Commissioner Joseph Lehman is providing newfound leadership within the Department of Corrections.

Unfortunately, the growing problem of overcrowding within the state correctional system continues to outstrip the response. Even if all the projected new cells are added to the state system by 1995, the system will still be at almost 150% of capacity. Commitment, initiative and leadership from the Executive Branch, particularly in the areas of parole reform and alternative punishment, continues to be needed to address this problem. Without the needed commitment, initiative and leadership from the Executive Branch, it is unlikely that Pennsylvania will take the necessary steps to manage our inmate population.

V. Conclusion

The purpose of the state prison system is to incarcerate antisocial, often violent, criminals. When large numbers of such persons are placed within the confines of a correctional institution, disturbances such as those which occurred at the correctional institutions at Huntingdon, Rockview and Graterford are inevitable. When antisocial, violent inmates are placed in inappropriate institutions due to the pressures of prison overcrowding, supervised by correctional officers and administrators with insufficient resources and skewed priorities because of the same overcrowding situations, disturbances such as occurred at Camp Hill are inevitable. The protection of the public, and the safety of the brave and dedicated people who work in our correctional institutions require that this administration and this legislature either commit the funds to construct the cells necessary to house our inmate population in a secure and appropriate manner, or provide the corrections system with the alternatives necessary to confine, manage and supervise the inmate population effectively.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA

HOUSE RESOLUTION

No. 226

Session of
1989

INTRODUCED BY NAILOR, MOWERY, HAYES, BUNT, CALTAGIRONE, NOYE, BROUJOS, B. SMITH, MARSICO, PICCOLA, DININNI, HAGARTY, HECKLER, KOSINSKI, BLAUM, JOSEPHS, GRUITZA, McHALE, RITTER, VEON, MOEHLMANN, McVERRY, BIRMELIN, LASHINGER, REBER, WOGAN, R. C. WRIGHT, BORTNER, DORR, HESS, GIGLIOTTI, HERMAN, JAROLIN, ARGALL, CORNELL, VROON, HERSHEY, FAIRCHILD, JOHNSON, HASAY, CARLSON, DeLUCA, ADOLPH, BARLEY, BILLOW, BRANDT, BURD, BUSH, CAPPABIANCA, CESSAR, CLYMER, DAVIES, DIETTERICK, FARGO, FARMER, FLEAGLE, HOWLETT, JACKSON, KONDRICH, LANGTRY, SCHEETZ, BLACK, GLADECK, LAUGHLIN, PISTELLA, DEMPSEY, MERRY, PESCI, FEE, SERAFINI, WILSON, CIVERA, RYAN, ROBBINS, STRITTMATTER, MAYERNIK, NAHILL, PHILLIPS, PITTS, RYBAK, SAURMAN, G. SNYDER, E. Z. TAYLOR, J. TAYLOR, TELEK, J. L. WRIGHT, GODSHALL AND D. F. CLARK, NOVEMBER 13, 1989

AMENDED, NOVEMBER 14, 1989

A RESOLUTION

1 Directing the House Judiciary Committee to study and investigate
2 all aspects of the recent rioting at the State Correctional
3 Institution at Camp Hill, at the State Correctional
4 Institution at Huntingdon, at the State Correctional
5 Institution at Graterford, AT THE STATE CORRECTIONAL
6 INSTITUTION AT ROCKVIEW and at the other prison facilities
7 throughout this Commonwealth.

8 WHEREAS, The State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill was
9 the scene of two separate riots over a three-day period
10 beginning on October 25, 1989, and ending on October 28, 1989;
11 and

12 WHEREAS, It has been reported that the two prison riots at
13 the Camp Hill prison have resulted in at least 107 injuries and
14 in the destruction, by fire, of at least 14 of the 31 buildings

1 on the prison grounds, and

2 WHEREAS, The Camp Hill prison facility, with an inmate
3 capacity of 1,826, reportedly contained more than 2,600 inmates
4 at the time of the riots; and

5 WHEREAS, It has been reported that the widespread destruction
6 of prison facilities at Camp Hill may require the transfer of
7 nearly 1,000 prisoners to other prison facilities which
8 themselves are overcrowded; and

9 WHEREAS, The response to the Camp Hill prison riots raises a
10 number of serious questions, including, but not limited to,
11 questions as to how a second riot could have occurred one day
12 after a "lock down" that was imposed in the aftermath of the
13 first riot, questions about the incarceration of Camp Hill
14 prisoners at alternative prison facilities, questions
15 surrounding the adequacy of protection for neighboring
16 communities against escapes during the course of the riots, and
17 questions regarding the causes and cost of the riots at the Camp
18 Hill facility, the response to the riots, and the prevention of
19 and response to future riots; and

20 WHEREAS, A riot also occurred at the State Correctional
21 Institution at Huntingdon on October 23, 1989, which reportedly
22 resulted in 48 injuries; and

23 WHEREAS, A riot also occurred at the State Correctional
24 Institution at Graterford on November 1, 1989, which reportedly
25 resulted in 7 injuries; and

26 WHEREAS, A RIOT ALSO OCCURRED AT THE STATE CORRECTIONAL
27 INSTITUTION AT ROCKVIEW ON FEBRUARY 7, 1989, WHICH REPORTEDLY
28 RESULTED IN 18 INJURIES; AND

29 WHEREAS, A need exists to consider ways of reducing the high
30 number of injuries sustained by corrections officers and other

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1 correctional personnel who acted with bravery and restraint
2 under extreme provocation during the riots at the State
3 Correctional Institutions at Camp Hill, Huntingdon and
4 Graterford, GRATERFORD AND ROCKVIEW; and

5 WHEREAS, A similar need exists to consider ways of reducing
6 the high number of injuries sustained by State and local police
7 officers and volunteer and other fire, ambulance, rescue and
8 emergency personnel who performed with distinction and courage
9 during the riots at the State Correctional Institutions; and

10 WHEREAS, The riots at the Camp Hill, Huntingdon and
11 Graterford, GRATERFORD AND ROCKVIEW State correctional
12 facilities and elsewhere justify a review of prison overcrowding
13 and other factors that might have a bearing on the recent riots
14 and the responses thereto at prison facilities; and

15 WHEREAS, Consequences of the two Camp Hill prison riots and
16 the Huntingdon prison riot and the Graterford prison riot, as
17 reflected in the numerous injuries, the substantial financial
18 costs that will accrue to the Commonwealth and the severe
19 additional strain that has been placed on other overcrowded
20 prison facilities, require a full and complete inquiry into the
21 causes of and the responses to these riots; therefore be it

22 RESOLVED, That the House of Representatives direct the
23 Judiciary Committee to study and investigate all aspects of the
24 recent rioting at the State Correctional Institution at Camp
25 Hill, at the State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon, at
26 the State Correctional Institution at Graterford, AT THE STATE
27 CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT ROCKVIEW and at other prison
28 facilities throughout this Commonwealth, including the causes of
29 and the responses to such riots, and to fully examine and to
30 make recommendations regarding the prevention of future riots at

1 prison facilities, and

2 RESOLVED, That the committee may hold hearings, take
3 testimony and make its investigations at such places as it deems
4 necessary in this Commonwealth. Each member of the committee
5 shall have power to administer oaths and affirmations to
6 witnesses appearing before the committee; and be it further

7 RESOLVED, That the committee shall report to the House of
8 Representatives on its activities, findings and recommendations,
9 and shall issue interim reports to the House of Representatives
10 as the committee deems necessary.

A REPORT BY
DONALD T. VAUGHN, SUPERINTENDENT
STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT GRATERFORD
TO THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
REGARDING THE
NOVEMBER 1, 1989 DISTURBANCE AT THE
STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT GRATERFORD
GRATERFORD, PA

On the morning of November 1, 1989, an incident involving several officers and inmates occurred at the State Correctional Institution at Graterford which resulted in a partial lockdown and a limited State of Emergency for B-Block, a general population cell house.

What follows is a detailed account of the events of Wednesday, November 1, 1989:

At approximately 9:00 AM, Officer Gary Laurenzi, who was assigned general security duties in the main corridor, observed an inmate, Frank Paige, AS-3392, wondering about socializing with other inmates traveling to and from their work and school locations. Since inmates are not permitted to loiter or otherwise "hang out" in this area, Officer Laurenzi stopped inmate Paige and asked him for his pass. Inmate Paige did not produce a pass and replied, "I don't have to give you my pass". Since inmate Paige did not have proper authorization to be in the main corridor, Officer Laurenzi ordered inmate Paige to accompany him to the Control Center where inmate Paige would be properly identified and questioned further as to why he was in an un-authorized area at this time of day. Inmate Paige, who was becoming noticeably more belligerent, refused to comply with the Officer's second order.

At this point, Officer Laurenzi radioed the Control Center and requested assistance to escort inmate Paige. Sergeant Kenneth Sobolewski responded and ordered inmate Paige to accompany them to the Control Center. Inmate Paige complied, however, as they came within approximately 20 feet of the entrance, inmate Paige balked and stated, "I'm not going in there". The order was again given to inmate Paige and he again refused. He then turned and attempted to walk away. Both Officers caught up with inmate Paige and in their attempt to stop and restrain him he resisted and a struggle ensued. They all fell to the floor. As they struggled, a second inmate approached the three and struck Officer Laurenzi in the face with his fist. The inmate then began to run down the main corridor in the direction of B-Block and ignored repeated orders by Officers to stop.

Lieutenant Gerald Sobotor, who was walking in the main corridor, came upon Sergeant Sobolewski and Officer Laurenzi and assisted them with the handcuffing of inmate Paige. Inmate Paige was then taken to the Control Center for identification purposes and later escorted to the institution infirmary to determine if medical attention was needed and/or a urinalysis for drugs or alcohol should be done. Inmate Paige refused to cooperate and due to his disposition and attitude, no drug or alcohol urinalysis was taken and he was then taken back to the Control Center.

Once back at the Control Center, Sergeant Sobolewski informed Officer Laurenzi that inmate Dennis McKeithan, BB-2253, a corridor janitor who was well known to many Officers was the inmate who had assaulted Officer Laurenzi with his fist. This was verified by Officer Thomas Holdren who was also assigned to the main corridor. Officer Holdren had observed inmate McKeithan run down the

corridor and enter B-Block as well. At B-Block's door, Officer Randy Shultz was in the process of opening the door to allow inmates out of the cell block and observed inmate McKeithan run past him and push through a crowd of inmates as he made his way onto the block and eventually to the bridge area which is located in the center of the cell block. Officer Holdren then joined Officer Shultz and informed him of what had just occurred in the main corridor. Upon hearing this, Officer Shultz immediately secured B-Block's main corridor door and he and Officer Holdren then proceeded to the bridge to confront inmate McKeithan. Once at the bridge, both Officers observed inmate McKeithan pick up a broom, break off the handle, and say, "I'm not going anywhere".

Roughly fifteen minutes had passed since the initial altercation with inmate Faige and Officer Laurenzi. By now, Lieutenant's Williams and Sobotor, along with Sergeant's James Macon and Michael Bivins, along with other Officers assigned to B-Block, converged on the bridge. Inmate McKeithan was now making several threatening gestures at the Officers. Lieutenant Stephen Williams ordered him to put down the broom handle but inmate McKeithan refused. The order was repeated, and inmate McKeithan continued to refuse. Now, other inmates, who up until this point had been content in watching the incident unfold, began to gather in the immediate area. As Lieutenant Williams observed the dozen or so inmates press closer, inmate McKeithan, without provocation, struck Lieutenant Williams in the head and shoulder with an overhand blow with the broken broom handle. Officers, at this point, attempted to subdue inmate McKeithan, however, approximately seven other inmates joined in and assaulted Officers with their fists and at least one other broken broom handle. Inmate McKeithan, who is also involved, manages to elude the Officer's grasp and steal away to the rear of the block where he is joined by a group of between seven and twelve inmates on the upper tier section.

At this point, the Control Center is notified by Sergeant Michael Bivins that additional Officers are needed on B-Block. The Control Center in turn notifies myself and I proceed to the area. At the same time, one of the Institution's Corrections Emergency Response Teams (C.E.R.T.) under the direction of Lieutenant Guy Smith was activated and advised to dress and remain on standby until further orders are received. The Superintendent's Assistant, A. J. LeFebvre, was given the direction to activate the Institution's Command Post and Emergency Plan Procedures as they pertain to a large disturbance. Meanwhile, Lieutenant Williams and all other block Officers present begin giving orders to all inmates on B-Block to retire to their cells. The inmates comply. Lieutenant's Williams and Sobotor and additional Officers proceed to the upper rear section where inmate McKeithan and the other inmates are held up. At this point, they are joined by Lieutenant Jasper Davis, who is now assisting Officers in locking inmates in their respective cells. Inmate McKeithan, realizing his options were now depleted at this point, approached Lieutenant Davis and advises that he does not want any further trouble. Lieutenant Davis and Sergeant Bivins then escort inmate McKeithan off of B-Block to where they meet Captain Creighton Caison who in turn escorts inmate McKeithan to the Control Center. At approximately 9:30 AM, I order a complete lockdown of B-Block. At 9:45 AM, some forty minutes after the incident in the main corridor with inmate Frank Paige, all 485 inmates assigned to B-Block would be secured in their cells and the block would be locked down. At this point, I notified the Commissioner, David S. Owens, Jr., of what had occurred and action that I had taken in regards locking down the block and preparing to shake down and informing him that the block would be fed in until the completion of the shake down. My actions were sanctioned by the Commissioner. I requested and received authorization from Commissioner David S.

Owens, Jr. to declare a limited State of Emergency for B-Block. This would allow teams of Correctional Officers to do a thorough cell by cell search of the block for weapons and any other contraband. Our rationale for this was due to information received about the altercation at the bridge when inmates were seen to have had in their possession homemade weapons, possibly homemade knives.

B-Block would remain locked down from Wednesday, November 1, 1989, until Saturday, November 11, 1989. During this time, the entire block would be searched and all items considered to be contraband would be confiscated, catalogued, and properly disposed of.

As a result of the State Police investigation, seven other inmates would be identified and appropriately charged with institution infractions. They are:

David Marsh, AY-8586
Benjamin Garvin, AH-9376
Howard Ford, AY-7510
Harry Robinson, AM-8798
Edward Holson, AP-2770
Ronald Baxter, AF-8757
Frank Paige, AS-3392

In all, six Correctional Officers would sustain injuries which required first aid and/or outside hospital treatment. One inmate required first aid and was later returned to his cell. No property damages were reported.

As a result of his involvement, inmate Dennis McKeithan who is currently serving a 55-110 year sentence for robbery and conspiracy, was charged by the Montgomery County District Attorney's Office with simple assault, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, assault by a prisoner and attempting to riot. He faces an additional sentence if convicted.

Although this incident was believed to have been an isolated incident and in no way connected with the events at Camp Hill one week earlier, or the incident at Huntingdon or the Holmesburg uprising on the weekend of October 28, 1989, it is considered to have contributed significantly to a dramatic change in the atmosphere of the institution. In the days immediately following the Camp Hill uprising, the tension level between staff and inmates alike had increased noticeably and this incident of November 1, 1989 served to fuel rumors of retaliation and thereby escalate tensions even further. Throughout the remainder of the day, Wednesday, November 1, 1989, and Thursday and Friday, the frequency of rumors and threats of retaliation continued to increase. Staff received information from inmate relatives, volunteers, and various community leaders that they had been talking with inmates from Graterford in telephone conversations about an impending disturbance. This disturbance, although at one point was planned to be peaceful, it would likely turn violent and thereby endanger the safety and well-being of inmates and staff alike. Given this information, I felt that it would be prudent security wise to initiate a complete lockdown for the State Correctional Institution at Graterford effective at 6:00 AM on Saturday, November 4, 1989. At 0100 on Saturday morning, I informed the Commissioner of Corrections, David S. Owens, Jr., of my feelings and my concerns in reference to what the total scenario of what had occurred in the last three

days. My request was made to the Commissioner of Corrections, David S. Owens, Jr. who in turn, approved my request to issue a full State of Emergency for the State Correctional Institution at Graterford. The State of Emergency would last from Saturday, November 4, 1989 until Saturday, November 11, 1989. With the exception of an incident on E-Block on Saturday, November 4, 1989 when inmates lit several small fires on E-Block, the total lockdown was uneventful. During this time, the entire staff at Graterford participated in an institution wide shakedown of all areas for the purpose of finding and confiscating all unauthorized items which might be present. It should be pointed out also that during this time the morale among staff and inmates alike improved and tensions subsided as well.

In summary, I believe that the event of November 1, 1989 in and of itself would not normally receive the amount of attention from the media and public at large if it did not occur on the heels of the Camp Hill uprising or the Holmesburg disturbance on October 28, 1989. Finally, I believe that our staff responded appropriately and in a professional manner during the incident of November 1, 1989 and throughout the lockdown here at Graterford.

REPORT
on the Disturbance at
State Correctional Institution at Rockview
by
Joseph F. Mazurkiewicz, Ph.D.
Superintendent
to the
House Judiciary Committee

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

On Tuesday, February 7, 1989, a major disturbance took place in the institution Dining Hall and on the walkways near the Dining Hall involving inmates, correctional officers, maintenance officers and Correctional Industries officers. The disturbance resulted in injuries to nineteen staff members and six inmates. The costs created by the disturbance included \$698.41 for equipment, \$277.40 for food items and numerous hours in inmate and staff overtime.

The events leading up to this disturbance began at approximately 2:05 p.m. when a Corrections Officer had a confrontation with an inmate on the walkway near the Commissary.

The Officer observed a group of inmates who were loitering on the walk in the Commissary area. He ordered them to clear the walks twice, but they did not move. He started to walk towards them and they began to move along, except for one. That inmate was again ordered to clear the walk. The officer turned to walk back to the front of the Commissary when the inmate grabbed the officer's arm saying "if you're gonna write me up, I'll give you a reason to send me to the RHU right now. You chump ass guards, you're gonna have to lock down the whole jail today." The inmate then left the area and returned to C Block.

A short time later the inmate tried to enter the office area in C Block and came towards the same officer. At this point the Block Sergeant called the Control Center for assistance.

Two Lieutenants arrived shortly thereafter. At approximately this time sixty or more inmates gathered in C Block in a threatening way, apparently planning to interfere with the Officers' efforts to control the inmate. At this same time C Block began a line movement to eat supper and the inmate mingled in with the large group who were moving to the Culinary Building.

The inmate was spotted by Officers in the Culinary hallway; he voluntarily went with them to the Control Booth in the front of the hallway. Seeing this, a group of fifty to sixty inmates then refused to enter the Dining Room from the corridor at approximately 3:40 p.m.; they remained in the hallway despite numerous orders from Officers to continue through the meal line. A large group of inmates then began moving toward the Control Booth apparently in a show of force and stormed the area. The inmates also entered the Dining Room, assaulting staff members with metal pitchers, salt shakers, cups, bowls, food trays and fists. There were approximately 400 to 500 inmates in the Dining Room at that time. The specific number of inmates who took an active role in the disturbance is unknown, but did not include a majority of the inmates present in the Dining Room.

Within a few minutes the disturbance spilled out onto the walkway in front of the Culinary Building where inmates continued to punch, kick and further assault staff members who had come to provide assistance. At this same time the Deputy Superintendent for Operations, Deputy Superintendent for Treatment, Major of the Guard and the Director of Treatment were notified of the incident. The four of them proceeded to the area of the walkway between the Dining Room Building and Education Building. At this point, the inmates stopped their assaultive behavior and started to talk to the Administrative Staff on the scene. This staff, rather than enter into a dialogue with the inmates, ordered five inmates who were apparent spokesmen or leaders of the group into a room of the Education Building for a discussion of the inmate's concerns and ordered the remaining inmates to return to their cell blocks. The inmates then began dispersing, returning to their housing units. By 4:45 p.m. B Block, East Wing and West Wing reported that all inmates were locked in their cells. A group of

approximately 100 inmates in C Block continued to refuse to return to their cells; they eventually locked-in sometime after 5:00 p.m. after the inmates who were in the Education Building returned to the block.

The supper line was resumed at 6:30 p.m. when groups of approximately forty inmates at a time were released from their cells to go eat. This process was completed at 10:00 p.m. without further incident. The institution returned to a normal schedule on the next morning. When the noon meal was completed and the mid-day count was completed, the inmates were kept in their cells in C Block where a complete shakedown and general search of each cell in the block took place. No weapons were found.

A total of nineteen (19) staff members were injured in the disturbance. Thirteen (13) were treated at the Centre Community Hospital; twelve (12) were released after treatment and one (1) was hospitalized. Six (6) additional personnel were treated in the institution's Dispensary only. The specific reported injuries are as follows:

Corrections Officer 1: hit with metal pitcher, "pinched nerve" in neck.

Corrections Officer 1: punched in head, swelling of front area of forehead, some dizziness.

Corrections Officer 1: hit on leg with metal pitcher, punched in head, contusion of right calf, minor contusion of temporal area.

Utility Plant Supervisor: hit in upper back area, kicked in head and ribs.

Corrections Officer 3: punched and kicked, bruise behind left ear, contusion below right knee, slight contusion of left rib cage, edema left elbow.

Sewage Plant Supervisor: punched in left eye and shoulder, possible tear of left eyelid, corneal abrasion.

Corrections Officer 3: punched in face and head, laceration of right eye, swollen left ear, scrape left cheek area.

Corrections Officer 1: hit several times on head, laceration of right cheek, slight edema of forehead.

Corrections Officer 1: hit on left side of neck with metal pitcher, punched several times in mouth and jaw, several scratches on left side of neck, 3/4" laceration on chin, pains in neck.

Corrections Officer 1: numerous inmates had officer on floor beating him with metal pitcher, pain in cervical spine area and left scapula area.

Food Service Instructor: hit on back of head with metal pitcher, scalp laceration, contusions and abrasions of head.

Corrections Officer 1: hit in face, facial bruises.

Labor Foreman 2: struck on jaw with fist, hematoma inside lower lip.

Corrections Activities Specialist: punched in head, bruised temple, bruised chest, hematoma right side of scalp.

Corrections Plumbing Trade Instructor: punched in face, abrasion of forehead, bruise above left eye.

Corrections Officer 1: hit on head.

Corrections Food Service Manager 2: hit on top of left shoulder with metal pitcher.

Sawmill Foreman: punched behind left ear, bump on back of head.

There were five inmates who were treated for minor injuries in the institution's Dispensary.

Only one staff member is still off work as a result of the disturbance.

Misconducts and Criminal Charges

Fourteen (14) inmates received a total of forty-one (41) misconducts. A total of sixty-four (64) criminal charges were lodged by the Pennsylvania State Police against fourteen (14) inmates with nine (9) defendants either pleading guilty or being found guilty of their crimes. Charges against five (5) of the inmates were dismissed. All criminal charges have been processed through the Centre County Court of Common Pleas.

THOMAS A. FULCOMER, SUPERINTENDENT
STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT HUNTINGDON

TO THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

REGARDING THE

OCTOBER 23, 1989 DISTURBANCE AT THE
STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT HUNTINGDON
HUNTINGDON, PA

BEFORE I PROCEED WITH THIS REPORT, I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO COMMEND THE HUNTINGDON STAFF FOR THE EXCELLENT JOB THEY DID IN CONTROLLING AND RESOLVING THE DISTURBANCE. THEY WERE FACED WITH A DANGEROUS SITUATION, BUT ACTED COURAGEOUSLY IN DOING WHAT THEY HAD TO DO IN ORDER TO RETAKE THE CELL BLOCK. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO THANK THE SMITHFIELD STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, HUNTINGDON BOROUGH POLICE, AND THE HUNTINGDON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE. IN ADDITION, THE ASSISTANCE OF THE VARIOUS FIRE AND AMBULANCE SERVICES WAS INVALUABLE. IT WAS THROUGH THE COORDINATED EFFORTS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL STAFF AND THE COMMUNITY AGENCIES THAT THE SITUATION WAS RESOLVED SUCCESSFULLY. I AM PROUD OF THE HUNTINGDON STAFF AND THE WILLINGNESS OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY AGENCIES TO OFFER THEIR ASSISTANCE WITHOUT HESITATION.

ON OCTOBER 23RD, 1989, A DISTURBANCE OCCURRED AT THE STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION LOCATED AT HUNTINGDON. THE INCIDENT OCCURRED IN A-BLOCK, A GENERAL POPULATION HOUSING AREA, INSIDE THE INSTITUTION. BEFORE DISCUSSING THE DETAILS OF THE INCIDENT, I WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT AT NO TIME WAS THE COMMUNITY IN DANGER. THE DISTURBANCE WAS CONFINED TO ONE CELL BLOCK AND THE PERIMETER OF THE INSTITUTION WAS SECURE.

ON OCTOBER 23, 1989, THE INSTITUTION WAS OPERATING UNDER EMERGENCY CONDITIONS AS A RESULT OF AN UNRELATED INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON OCTOBER 20, 1989.

THE INMATES WERE BEING FED ONE CELL BLOCK AT A TIME. AT APPROXIMATELY 5:20 P.M., A-BLOCK INMATES WERE RELEASED FROM THEIR CELLS TO GO FOR SUPPER. AN INMATE STOPPED AT THE OFFICER'S DESK TO SIGN FOR HIS LEGAL MAIL. EARLIER, WHEN THE MAIL WAS BEING PASSED OUT ON A-BLOCK, THE INMATE HAD REFUSED TO SIGN FOR HIS LEGAL MAIL. THAT INMATE AND ANOTHER STOPPED AT THE OFFICER'S DESK. THE SERGEANT OBSERVED THE ONE INMATE LOITERING NEAR THE DESK. HE THEN ORDERED THE INMATE TO PROCEED TO THE DINING HALL. THE INMATE REFUSED TO OBEY THE ORDER AND THE SERGEANT THEN INSTRUCTED HIM TO GO TO THE INSTITUTIONAL CONTROL CENTER. THE INMATE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT GOING TO DO THAT, AND THREATENED THE OFFICER. THE SERGEANT ATTEMPTED TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION BY NOT ISSUING ANY FURTHER ORDERS, AND PERMITTED THOSE TWO INMATES TO GO TO THE DINING ROOM. THE SERGEANT THEN REPORTED THE INCIDENT TO THE CAPTAIN IN CHARGE. THE CAPTAIN INSTRUCTED THE OFFICER NOT TO CONFRONT THE INMATES WHEN THEY RETURNED FROM THE DINING HALL. IT WAS DECIDED TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM WITH THE INMATES ONCE A-BLOCK WAS SECURED.

AT APPROXIMATELY 5:45 P.M., THE INMATES STARTED TO RETURN TO A-BLOCK FROM THE DINING HALL. THE REGULAR OFFICER ASSIGNED TO A-BLOCK NOTICED A GROUP OF 25 TO 30 INMATES GATHERING ON THE FOURTH TIER NEAR THE BLOCK TV. THAT OFFICER WAS THEN ORDERED BY THE SERGEANT TO DOUBLE-LOCK ALL CELLS ON THE THIRD TIER.

FROM THE COMMAND CENTER, THE SHIFT COMMANDER OBSERVED THAT INMATES WERE GATHERING IN THE FRONT OF A-BLOCK AND THINGS WERE NOT NORMAL. THE CAPTAIN DISPATCHED SIX OFFICERS FROM ANOTHER BLOCK TO A-BLOCK, TO HELP SECURE A-BLOCK. ANOTHER CAPTAIN WAS DISPATCHED TO THE A-BLOCK AREA TO SUPERVISE AND OBSERVE. AT 5:59 P.M. THE CAPTAIN ASSIGNED TO THE BLOCK REPORTED THAT TWO GROUPS OF INMATES WERE NOT GOING TO THEIR CELLS. THE OFFICERS ON THE BLOCK WERE ABLE TO SECURE

THE TIERS. OCCUPIED CELLS ON TIERS 2, 3 AND 5 WERE DOUBLE-LOCKED. THE OFFICERS ON A-BLOCK REPORTED THE INMATES WERE BEGINNING TO ACT AGGRESSIVELY. SEVERAL OF THE OFFICERS WERE INFORMED BY INMATES THAT "THEY HAD BETTER GET OFF THE BLOCK - IT WAS GOING DOWN". THE CAPTAIN THEN ISSUED AN ORDER FOR THE OFFICERS TO EVACUATE THE BLOCK. JUST AS THE LAST OFFICER EXITED A-BLOCK, AN INMATE THREW A LARGE BENCH IN FRONT OF THE GRILLE, TWO OTHER INMATES SLID THE OFFICER'S DESK IN FRONT OF THE GRILLE, AND BEGAN TO BARRICADE THE ENTRANCE. THE CAPTAIN THEN ACTIVATED THE INSTITUTION'S EMERGENCY PLAN. OFF DUTY PERSONNEL WERE NOTIFIED TO REPORT TO WORK, UTILIZING THE INSTITUTION'S CALL-IN SYSTEM. THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE WERE NOTIFIED, AND ALL AVAILABLE PERSONNEL GATHERED IN THE CONTROL CENTER AREA. THERE WERE INMATES WHO HAD NOT RETURNED FROM SUPPER, AND WERE BEING CONTAINED IN THE LOWER CORRIDOR. THE INMATES IN A-BLOCK WERE RIOTING, DESTROYING FURNITURE, BREAKING WINDOWS, AND BARRICADING ALL OF THE ENTRANCES TO A-BLOCK. FIRE HOSES WERE LAID AND CHARGED AS THE INMATES ATTEMPTED TO SET FIRES IN A-BLOCK. THE OFFICERS MANNING THE FIRE HOSES WERE ASSAULTED BY THE REBELLIOUS INMATES. THE INMATES WERE THROWING LOCKS, SPEARS (MADE FROM MOP AND BROOM HANDLES), SCOURING POWDER, AND OTHER ITEMS AT THESE OFFICERS.

A COMMAND POST WAS ESTABLISHED IN THE SUPERINTENDENT'S OFFICE. COMMISSIONER OWENS WAS NOTIFIED, AND WE MAINTAINED CONSTANT CONTACT WITH HIM THROUGHOUT THE INCIDENT. INFORMATION INDICATED THAT INMATES WERE OBSERVED CARRYING HEAVY OBJECTS, INCLUDING RADIATORS, ONTO THE TIERS. IT WAS BELIEVED THE INMATES WOULD DROP THESE OBJECTS ONTO PERSONNEL ENTERING AT GROUND LEVEL. THE DECISION WAS MADE FOR THE INSTITUTIONAL EMERGENCY SQUAD TO ENTER A-BLOCK. A TACTICAL PLAN WAS DEVELOPED THROUGH THE COMMAND POST. I AM NOT AT LIBERTY TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF OUR TACTICAL EMERGENCY PLAN IN THIS REPORT; HOWEVER, IF COMMITTEE MEMBERS DESIRE THIS INFORMATION, I WOULD BE PLEASED TO DETAIL THE INCIDENT TO THEM PERSONALLY. TO DETAIL THE SPECIFICS OF THE PLAN IN THIS REPORT, WOULD VIOLATE SAFETY AND SECURITY PROCEDURES AT THE INSTITUTION.

AT 8:50 P.M., I ISSUED THE ORDER FOR THE EMERGENCY SQUAD TO RETAKE THE BLOCK. SEVERAL SQUADS OF OFFICERS WERE ORDERED TO ENTER THE BLOCK. THEY DEPLOYED DOWN TWO TIERS OF THE BLOCK, LOCKING CELLS AND HANDCUFFING INMATES FOUND IN UNLOCKED CELLS. THE SQUADS MET LITTLE RESISTANCE UNTIL THEY ARRIVED AT THE REAR OF THE CELL BLOCK. THERE THEY WERE MET BY A GROUP OF INMATES THROWING SPEARS, SCAFFOLD WHEELS, SWINGING CLUBS AND MAKING THREATENING GESTURES. THE INMATES RETREATED TO THE GROUND LEVEL WHERE THEY CONTINUED TO TAUNT, THREATEN AND THROW OBJECTS AT THE OFFICERS AS THEY CONTINUED TO MOVE FORWARD. HEAVY RESISTANCE WAS ENCOUNTERED AT THE REAR OF THE BLOCK. THE EMERGENCY SQUAD FOUGHT HAND-TO-HAND WITH A GROUP OF INMATES AS THEY PUSHED THE RIOTERS TOWARD THE FRONT OF THE BLOCK. THE INMATES WERE ARMED WITH CLUBS AND HOMEMADE KNIVES. THE EMERGENCY SQUAD WAS EQUIPPED WITH HELMETS, VESTS AND RIOT STICKS. THE INMATES WERE EVENTUALLY PHYSICALLY SUBDUED. AFTER THE INMATES WERE RESTRAINED, INSTITUTIONAL PERSONNEL REGAINED CONTROL OF A-BLOCK. EACH CELL WAS DOUBLE-LOCKED AND ADDITIONAL RIOTERS WERE IDENTIFIED. THE BLOCK WAS DECLARED AS SECURED AT 9:25 P.M. PHYSICIANS WERE ON DUTY AND THREE TRIAGE TEAMS WERE ESTABLISHED. FORTY-FOUR EMPLOYEES WERE TREATED AT THE ONE TRIAGE AREA, AND 22 INMATES WERE TREATED AT THE INSTITUTION INFIRMARY, OR AT ANOTHER TRIAGE AREA. A COUNT WAS CONDUCTED AND ALL INMATES WERE ACCOUNTED FOR BY 10:30 P.M. ALL LOCKS AND LOCKING MECHANISMS WERE CHECKED AND WERE FOUND TO BE IN PROPER WORKING ORDER. ONE DESTROYED PADLOCK WAS REPLACED. A VIDEO CAMERA WAS UTILIZED TO RECORD THE DAMAGES PRIOR TO CLEAN UP.

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT, A DEBRIEFING WAS HELD IN THE SUPERINTENDENT'S OFFICE. THE INSTITUTIONAL STAFF AND STATE POLICE WERE DEBRIEFED REGARDING THE TACTICAL ASSAULT BY A LEADER OF THE GROUP. NORMAL INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITIES WERE THEN SUSPENDED BY ME. CONTINGENCY PLANS WERE DISCUSSED TO PROVIDE THE BASIC NECESSITIES TO THE INMATE POPULATION.

SUBSEQUENT TO THE INCIDENT, A GENERAL SEARCH OF THE ENTIRE INSTITUTION WAS CONDUCTED. THAT SEARCH LASTED FOR SEVERAL DAYS. IN ADDITION, THE INSTITUTION'S SECURITY OFFICE AND THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE BEGAN TO INVESTIGATE THE DISTURBANCE. AS A RESULT OF THE INVESTIGATION, 52 INMATES WERE IDENTIFIED AS PARTICIPATING IN THE DISTURBANCE, AND WERE ISSUED MISCONDUCT REPORTS. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE HAS ALSO BEEN GATHERED TO FILE CRIMINAL CHARGES AGAINST 26 INMATES.

THROUGH THE INVESTIGATION, WE LEARNED THAT THE INITIAL GROUP OF INMATES (ESTIMATED TO BE 25 TO 30) WERE ABLE TO RELEASE OTHER INMATES WHOSE CELLS WERE NOT DOUBLE-LOCKED. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT AS MANY AS 100 INMATES PARTICIPATED IN THE RIOT TO SOME DEGREE. HOWEVER, IT IS BELIEVED THAT WHEN THE EMERGENCY SQUAD ENTERED THE BLOCK, MOST OF THE INMATES RETURNED TO THEIR CELLS.

THE DISTURBANCE CAUSED \$23,884.32 DAMAGE TO STATE PROPERTY IN A-BLOCK, AND THERE WAS \$49,420.12 WORTH OF DAMAGE TO A-SCHOOL. TOTAL DAMAGE AMOUNTED TO \$73,304.44.

IN CONCLUSION, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT SEVERAL INMATES WERE ABLE TO INCITE OTHERS INTO PARTICIPATING IN THIS DISTURBANCE. TENSIONS WERE HIGH ON OCTOBER 23RD, DUE TO SEVERAL INCIDENTS THAT OCCURRED ON OCTOBER 19TH AND 20TH. HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO INDICATION THAT A MAJOR DISTURBANCE WOULD OCCUR. THEREFORE, NO WARNINGS BY INMATES WERE RECEIVED BY ANY STAFF OFFICE, INDICATING A PLANNED DISTURBANCE WAS BEING FORMULATED, AND NO STAFF INDICATED A CONCERN FOR SUCH A PLANNED DISTURBANCE AS WELL. THIS PARTICULAR INCIDENT DID NOT APPEAR TO BE PLANNED. IT WAS MORE A SPONTANEOUS ACTION RESULTING FROM ONE INMATE'S REFUSAL TO OBEY THE DIRECT ORDER OF AN OFFICER.

PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE IN CONTACTING ME IF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
REQUIRES ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THIS DISTURBANCE.

CONTACT: Cameron Texter (717) 787-7895

HARRISBURG, Nov. 19 -- The Casey administration, the Department of Corrections and the General Assembly must do more than build cell space to reduce prison overcrowding and prevent riots like those last year at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, a House Judiciary Committee report concluded.

The committee, chaired by state Rep. Thomas Caltagirone, D-Berks, today released the report outlining what it found caused the riots at Camp Hill and at three other state prisons.

The report showed overcrowding caused the riots at Camp Hill and the state correctional institutions at Huntingdon, Graterford and Rockview.

"Inmates had too few educational and rehabilitative programs," Caltagirone said in introducing the report to the committee. "Such idleness led to hostility and allowed a paramilitary group to begin organizing.

"This committee has reported out several bills to reduce overcrowding through alternatives to prison. And, the state will build more prisons," he added. "But while the committee has labored for solutions, it has run into barriers in the legislature, the executive branch and the Department (of Corrections). State government must do what's necessary to find solutions, which is just beginning to occur."

Additionally, administrative and other problems led prison officials at Camp Hill to make critical mistakes that led to a second riot last October, the report showed. The report also showed that the Camp Hill facility, which originally was built in the 1930s to house juvenile delinquents, shouldn't have held maximum security inmates.

In his remarks, Caltagirone renewed his call for alternatives to imprisonment that include boot camps for juveniles delinquents and non-violent adult first offenders, intensive probation and parole, drug and alcohol treatment and other rehabilitative centers.

-more-

The report criticized the executive branch and the Department of Corrections for failing to show commitment, initiative and leadership needed to push alternatives to imprisonment through the legislature.

"Without the needed commitment, initiative and leadership from the executive branch, it is unlikely that Pennsylvania will take the necessary steps to manage our inmate population," the report revealed. "... Even if all the projected new cells are added to the state system by 1995, the system will still be at almost 150 percent of capacity."

Caltagirone did say, however, that Corrections Commissioner Joseph Lehman, appointed in April, has strongly backed alternatives.

While overcrowding caused the Graterford, Huntingdon and Rockview riots, officers quelled those disturbances in one day with few injuries and little damage. In paraphrasing the report, Caltagirone said the Camp Hill riots got out of hand a second day because of a lack of organization and communication among guards and administration. He said the problems led to "drastic errors," including:

-- No immediate show of force at E Gate where the first riot erupted. Such a show could have stopped the first riot.

-- Correctional officers guarded insecure cell blocks after the first riot. Officers and superintendents also failed to examine cell blocks to ensure inmates were locked down. No one paid strict attention that inmates could walk out of their cells because the locking mechanisms were within their reach.

-- Superintendent Robert Freeman failed to have a state police contingent immediately quell the first riot and failed to shakedown inmates after that riot.

Caltagirone summed up the report by saying: "We must see more commitment in the full legislature and in the administration to reduce overcrowding through prison construction and alternatives to imprisonment. We must give correctional officers resources they need. We must ensure officers and administration work together. To do anything less would endanger the public by allowing more riots to happen."

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STATE REP. TOM CALTAGIRONE'S CAMP HILL
RIOT REPORT REMARKS, NOV. 19, 1990

GOOD AFTERNOON. ABOUT A YEAR AGO,
THE HOUSE APPROVED RESOLUTION 226
DIRECTING THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE RIOTS AT STATE CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AT CAMP HILL, HUNTINGDON,
GRATERFORD AND ROCKVIEW.

THE INVESTIGATION INCLUDED TOURING
THE DAMAGED CAMP HILL PRISON, MEETING
VARIOUS CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT LEADERS
AND TAKING TESTIMONY FROM A LONG LIST OF
WITNESSES AT FOUR PUBLIC HEARINGS. TODAY
THE COMMITTEE HAS A REPORT ON WHAT
CAUSED THE RIOTS. IT MUST DECIDE WHETHER
TO RELEASE IT TO THE FULL HOUSE AS THE
ORIGINAL RESOLUTION DIRECTED IT TO DO.

THE REPORT ALSO FOCUSES ON PROBLEMS THAT RESULTED IN A SECOND CAMP HILL RIOT. IT ALSO EXAMINES ACTIONS THE STATE CAN TAKE TO AVOID RIOTS AND VIOLENCE.

IN SUMMARY, THE REPORT DOES REPORT THE OBVIOUS -- THAT THE OVERCROWDED CONDITIONS IN THE STATE PRISON SYSTEM DIRECTLY CAUSED THE RIOTS. INMATES HAD TOO FEW EDUCATIONAL AND REHABILITATIVE PROGRAMS. SUCH IDLENESS LED TO HOSTILITY AND ALLOWED A PARAMILITARY GROUP TO BEGIN ORGANIZING.

WE AS A GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE GOVERNOR AND THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS MUST WORK TOGETHER TO DO ALL WE CAN TO ELIMINATE OVERCROWDING.

THIS COMMITTEE HAS REPORTED OUT SEVERAL BILLS TO REDUCE OVERCROWDING THROUGH ALTERNATIVES TO PRISON.

AND THE STATE WILL BUILD MORE PRISONS. BUT WHILE THE COMMITTEE LABORED FOR SOLUTIONS, IT HAS RUN INTO BARRIERS IN THE LEGISLATURE, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE DEPARTMENT. STATE GOVERNMENT MUST DO WHAT'S NECESSARY TO FIND SOLUTIONS, WHICH IS JUST BEGINNING TO OCCUR. COMMISSIONER LEHMAN, HOWEVER, DOES SEEM TO HAVE A NEW RESOLVE.

REDUCING OVERCROWDING PROBABLY WOULD HAVE PREVENTED THE HUNTINGDON, ROCKVIEW AND GRATERFORD RIOTS. BUT THE CAMP HILL INCIDENTS WERE FAR TOO COMPLICATED. THE SECOND DAY OF RIOTING PROVED THAT THERE WAS MORE TO THE SITUATION--THAN JUST OVERCROWDING.

THE CAMP HILL RIOTS, -LIKE THE OTHERS, BEGAN BECAUSE SOME INMATES WANTED TO RIOT.

BUT PROBLEMS IN EACH LEVEL OF THE CAMP HILL ADMINISTRATION STOPPED THE RIOTS FROM BEING IMMEDIATELY QUELLED. THE PROBLEMS ALSO RESULTED IN AN EVEN MORE VIOLENT SECOND RIOT.

HAVING A PRISON BUILT FOR JUVENILES AND HOUSING VIOLENT MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATES ALSO DIDN'T HELP MATTERS.

CAMP HILL HAD A LONG HISTORY OF PROBLEMS IN GUARD ACTIVITIES AND DISCIPLINE. GUARD OFFICERS SPLIT IN CONTENDING FACTIONS. NO SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATION OR COOPERATION EXISTED BETWEEN GUARDS, GUARD OFFICERS, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENTS AND THE SUPERINTENDENT. THE SUPERINTENDENT WAS ISOLATED AND PLAYED NO DECISION-MAKING ROLE; THE LACK OF COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION LED TO DRASTIC ERRORS. THOSE INCLUDE:

-- NO IMMEDIATE SHOW OF FORCE AT E
GATE WHERE THE FIRST RIOT ERUPTED. SUCH
A SHOW COULD HAVE STOPPED THE FIRST RIOT
AND PREVENTED MORE VIOLENCE.

-- CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS GUARDING
INSECURE CELL BLOCKS AFTER THE FIRST
RIOT WITH INMATES WHO ACTED MOST
VIOLENT AND DESTRUCTIVE.

-- A FAILURE OF OFFICERS AND
SUPERINTENDENTS TO EXAMINE CELL BLOCKS
TO ENSURE INMATES WERE LOCKED DOWN AFTER
THE FIRST RIOT. INCREDIBLY, THE PRISON'S
MAINTENANCE CREW WAS SENT HOME EARLY
AFTER THE FIRST RIOT.

-- SUPERINTENDENT ROBERT FREEMAN
STOPPING A STATE POLICE CONTINGENT FROM
IMMEDIATELY QUELLING THE FIRST RIOT AND
HAVING NO SHAKEDOWN OF INMATES AFTER THE
FIRST RIOT.

INMATES ALSO KNEW THE INNER WORKINGS OF THE CELL LOCKING MECHANISMS BECAUSE THEY DID PRISON MAINTENANCE WORK. THEY KNEW THEY COULD REACH OUT OF THEIR CELLS, FLICK A MECHANISM AND POP OPEN DOORS IF PROTECTIVE METAL PLATES WERE REMOVED. INMATES REMOVED THE PLATES DURING THE FIRST RIOT. THEY WEREN'T REPLACED.

INMATES ALSO KNEW THEY ONLY HAD TO REMOVE AIR CONDITIONERS TO ENTER MANY BUILDINGS AND THE COMMAND CENTER. MANY ALSO KNEW CELL INTERIOR WALLS WERE DESIGNED FOR JUVENILES AND MADE ONLY OF HOLLOW STRUCTURAL TILE. THEY KNEW THEY COULD BREAK THROUGH WITH THEIR HANDS, HAMMERS AND OTHER TOOLS THEY CONCEALED WHEN FIRST RETURNED TO THEIR CELLS.

THE STATE SHOULD HAVE RENOVATED THE STRUCTURE FOR MAXIMUM SECURITY INMATES BEFORE MOVING SUCH PRISONERS THERE.

ALL THESE FACTORS LED TO THE SECOND NIGHT OF RIOTING, MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN DAMAGE AND MANY INJURIES. IT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED.

TWO POSITIVE NOTES: THE STATE POLICE UNITS WORKED WELL TO REGAIN CONTROL OF THE PRISON AND RELEASE HOSTAGES. THEY ARE TO BE COMMENDED. LOCAL POLICE, AMBULANCE, FIRE AND OTHER UNITS ALSO RESPONDED QUICKLY AND PROVIDED INVALUABLE SERVICE. WE THANK YOU ALL.

THE DEPARTMENT, HOWEVER, MUST PREPARE EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLANS FOR ALL PRISONS.

IT ALSO MUST SHARE THOSE PLANS WITH LOCAL AGENCIES TO PROTECT CITIZENS' LIFE AND PROPERTY.

THE STATE MUST NOT EVER LET A RIOT LIKE CAMP HILL EVER HAPPEN AGAIN. WE WERE LUCKY NO LOSS OF LIFE OCCURRED, THANKS TO STATE POLICE WORK.

WE MUST SEE MORE COMMITMENT IN THE FULL LEGISLATURE AND IN THE ADMINISTRATION TO REDUCE OVERCROWDING THROUGH PRISON CONSTRUCTION AND ALTERNATIVES TO IMPRISONMENT. WE MUST GIVE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS RESOURCES THEY NEED. WE MUST ENSURE THAT CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS AND ADMINISTRATION WORK TOGETHER.

TO DO ANYTHING LESS WOULD ENDANGER THE PUBLIC BY ALLOWING MORE RIOTS TO HAPPEN. THANK YOU. ###ct



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EDITORIALS

Shared blame

Society continues to pack prisons

THE STATE HOUSE JUDICIARY Committee report on last year's riot at the Camp Hill prison breaks no new ground but brings additional emphasis to the point that Pennsylvania is unlikely to build its way out of prison overcrowding.

Overcrowding was one of the main factors at work in two days of riots that destroyed the Camp Hill facility and provoked major disturbances at three other state prisons last year. Indeed, at least three reports before the riots addressed the overcrowding problem and since 1987 five new correctional facilities have been built and others expanded to provide 3,000 additional cells.

But while current plans call for construction of 8,000 additional cells, bringing the total to 21,700, the prison population is expected to swell to 32,000 by 1995, or 150 percent of the new capacity.

Overcrowding not only creates tension among inmates, it's clear that it also creates problems between guards and administrators, who, incredibly, were barely on speaking terms on the eve of the Camp Hill riot, according to the House report.

Pennsylvania is by no means unique in having overcrowded prisons but it is comparatively backward in rewarding good behavior with early release and in providing alternative forms of punishment, such as boot camps for first-time offenders.

It is here that the Legislature has fallen short by its propensity for enacting laws that increase the ranks and lengths of stay of prison-

ers, while ignoring or rejecting innovative and more lenient measures that might take the pressure off the prison system.

The Legislature, however, is only responding to a climate of fear in which society wants to inflict progressively harsher penalties on its miscreants. Not only has this "get-tough" approach proven to be a monumental failure, it is becoming increasingly obvious that it is part of the problem.

NOT SURPRISINGLY, the House report does not assign any blame to legislative failures and mistakes, which laid the groundwork for the debacle at Camp Hill. While the Casey administration cannot and should not be excused for the managerial and leadership failures exposed by the riots, the report of the House Judiciary Committee would have served more than as a repetitive exercise if it had acknowledged a shared responsibility for the corrections crisis.

More importantly, the committee failed to cut to the heart of the matter by questioning the philosophy and policies that have elevated "doing time" to the uniform response to every kind of crime, from murder to drunk driving. And you have to wonder what kind of future we are moving toward when, according to the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, the prison population will increase by almost a third in less than five years.

Maybe what we really need to ask is, "What's wrong with society?" Instead of, "What's wrong with the prison system?"

District News
11/21/90

What does a prisoner owe us?

THE CUMBERLAND COUNTY PRISON Board is considering a room-and-board fee for short-term prisoners; bed and breakfast with bars.

Responding to a recently enacted state law permitting prison operators to charge "a reasonable amount" for services rendered, the prison board is working up a fee schedule.

Warden Robert Egolf suggests the county charge its guests \$40 per night, based on the amount it charges to house prisoners from other jurisdictions. (A first-time offender convicted of driving under the influence would pay \$80 for his two-night stay.)

All that's left to work out is how the fee should be collected.

Prison board members seem to think this is a splendid idea, but we're not so sure. There is some-

thing about making a convict pay for his punishment that reeks of overkill, not unlike the practice in China of billing a condemned person's family for the cost of the bullet used to kill him. Suppose the prisoner doesn't have the \$40; what do they do, take it out of his hide?

PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, we see no logic in charging one group of prisoners for lodging while permitting another group — the long-term inmates — to stay *gratis*. In addition, most convicts must pay a fine for their offense.

But beyond practicalities, we believe society has some inherent responsibilities in the administration of justice. Among them is the obligation to provide no-frills shelter and basic, humane treatment to those whom society has deprived of their freedom.

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Panel links rioting to faulty leadership by Casey

By William R. Yingling Jr./Patriot-News

The Casey administration provided inadequate leadership within the Department of Corrections before the violent inmate uprising 13 months ago at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, a legislative panel said yesterday.

In a report that concludes its investigation into the riots at the Camp Hill and Huntingdon state prisons more than a year ago, the Democratic-controlled House Judiciary Committee said the Democratic administration was ill-prepared for the violence.

"The Department of Corrections is an administrative, Cabinet-level agency; an effective response to its problems requires commitment, initiative and

leadership from the executive branch of government," the 46-page report concluded. "The executive branch failed to provide these ingredients prior to the Camp Hill disturbances."

The report did not lay the full blame on the executive branch. It acknowledged that the prison was not physically built to house violent, high-security offenders; that overcrowding throughout the system contributed to the tension and that the chain of command and communications throughout the prison in Lower Allen Twp. were weak and in disarray.

Administration spokesman Vincent P. Carocci defended Gov. Robert P. Casey's record on corrections, saying it shows "aggressive attention" both before and after the three days of riots at Camp Hill

in October of 1989 that left 123 people injured and half of the prison in ruins.

"I don't think the criticism is justified," Carocci said. "A lot of things might seem clearer in hindsight."

He suggested that the Legislature has not helped to ease overcrowding in the system with its failure to reach a consensus on "earned-time" legislation, a plan the governor supports that would allow inmates to win early release for good behavior.

"Earned-time legislation was floating in the General Assembly for a two-year period and wasn't resolved and still isn't resolved," Carocci said.

The committee adopted the report by a vote of

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Camp Hill

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15-1. State Rep. Kevin Blaum, D-Wilkes-Barre, the dissenting vote, objected to parts of the report that attributed much of the cause to overcrowding.

The report said the administration at the Camp Hill prison "contributed substantially to the severity" of the riots.

There were problems with "activities and discipline" of the guards years before the riots, the report said. The guards and the

commissioned officers were split into "contending factions;" there was no communication or cooperation between the commissioned officers and the deputy superintendents; and the prison superintendent, Robert M. Freeman, was "isolated, aloof and removed from the day-to-day decision-making process."

The report also said the department's central administrative office deviated from policy by failing to set up a command post when inmates started the rioting.