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OFFICE OF
COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTIONS

December 22, 1989


The Honorable Robert P. Casey
Governor
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania

Dear Governor Casey:

Attached please find the Department of Corrections Special Investigative Committee Report on the Inmate Disturbance at the State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill on October 25 and 26, 1989.

Along with the report is the recommendations of the Investigative Committee.

Most sincerely,


David S. Owens, Jr.
Commissioner

DSO:ras

Attachment

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

Special Investigative Committee Report

*On the Inmate Disturbances at the
State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill
October 25, 1989 and October 26, 1989*

Committee Members:

Santo Samuel Andolina, Captain

State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh

Kenneth D. Kyler, Captain

State Correctional Institution at Smithfield

James H. Wilson, Captain

State Correctional Institution at Greensburg

John M. McCullough, Director of Treatment

State Correctional Institution at Rockview

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State Correction Institution at Camp Hill

Technical Support :

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Planning, Research, and Statistics Division

Department of Corrections, Central Office

SUMMARY

The Departmental Investigative Committee first convened on Monday, November 20, 1989 with the goal of examining the October 25-26 disturbances at Camp Hill. Over the course of three weeks we formally interviewed 74 staff members, including line staff and middle and upper management and toured the institution three times, where we interviewed numerous on duty staff and inmates. We also examined various reports and documents concerning the disturbance.

We would like to express our sincere thanks and appreciation to all of those employees who were interviewed and in any way contributed to the compiling of our report.

A special thanks to Mr. John Palakovich, SCI Administrative Assistant and Judy Brandt, Central Office Secretarial Supervisor for their special assistance.

CAMP HILL INSTITUTION

Total Population on 10/25/89	2,564
Total Population on 10/31/89	1,820
Capacity Before Riot	1,826
Capacity After Riot	1,626
Expected Population After Transfers	1,000
Injuries from Day 1	44
Staff	35
Inmates	9
Injuries from Day 2	76
STaff	34
Inmates	32

Handwritten notes:
M.B. b
System

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I. Conditions Prior to Disturbance

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO DISTURBANCE

Camp Hill was originally constructed as a juvenile institution to hold medium to minimum security offenders, but its mission had been switched so that it was receiving maximum security inmates. In particular, the location of the diagnostic center at Camp Hill allowed for the entry into the system of high security inmates and even capital cases. Like other Pennsylvania state correctional institutions, Camp Hill was beset with overcrowding, double celling and an increase in psychiatric cases. It had added 843 inmates to its population since 1983 bringing the total in this institution to 2613 inmates by September 1989. What this meant was that the crowding resulted in less than adequate shower facilities, long waiting lists for programs, more rushed meal lines, and a fair amount of idle time, all of which caused some unrest among the inmates. However, up until immediately before the disturbance, there were a few long-term indicators that the inmates would become involved in a large and destructive group action.

Along with its change in mission, came a change in the way that Camp Hill was managed. As it became more security oriented to meet the requirements of more difficult inmates, attempts were made to tighten up several security procedures to decrease the likelihood of escapes and other security breaches. Along with physical improvements to Camp Hill, the administration also started reviewing some of the policies that controlled the handling of inmates. Of particular concern was inmate family days, where food was allowed to be brought in to the institution and which had resulted in a considerable amount of contraband traffic. Along with the attempts to improve and increase security, Camp Hill also had to deal with several changes over a rather short period of time. Thus over the summer of 1989, they initiated a new grievance procedure, had to deal with policies on asbestos abatement, fire safety and other hazardous materials, converted to a new medical care system, released their AIDS patients into population, started accreditation work, revised restricted housing policies several times, and converted one block into a parole violator unit (which unfortunately united one large discontented group). Because both staff and inmates were being subjected to a quick change in policies and procedures, there was some lapse in the understanding of what the rules were by the inmates and in the enforcement of the rules by the officers. Thus there were certain gray areas in what the expectations of inmate behavior were. As a result, the discipline and control of inmates dropped off somewhat.

During the summer of 1989, there were several indicators that staff and inmates were becoming more stressed. Staff terminations, grievances and disciplinary action increased around the same time that overtime was decreased because of the demanning of the perimeter towers. Following these actions, sick leave increased, perhaps as a reaction to these adverse personnel actions. At about the same time, inmate misconducts and grievances started increasing, particularly those involving staff/inmate conflict like assaults and charges of harassment. Whether staff had a lower tolerance and wrote more misconducts or whether the inmates, feeling the limits gradually removed from them, acted out more is not known, but the situation was generally one of increased volatility and conflict on both sides.

In the late summer of 1989, misconducts suddenly dropped off, and it is also interesting that the percentage of men placed in disciplinary custody also dropped. For some reason, staff had started to perceive the use of misconducts as pointless, perhaps because of the decreased use of restricted housing as a punishment made them think that misconducts were written in vain, perhaps also the conflicts during the summer had tired them.

It is also of importance that this was not an experienced staff dealing with the inmates. Because two experienced deputy superintendents and many other correctional personnel had been promoted or transferred to new institutions, 47% of the corrections officers on the 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. shift had less than five (5) years experience and 67% of the corrections officers on the 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. shift had less than five (5) years experience. In other words, there was a lack of veteran personnel as line staff.¹

Two specific groups of inmates were also starting to make their presence felt. One of these groups was the parole violators, 200 of whom were housed together in one block. They were angry about not being able to work, about the delay in being classified, about too much idle time, and about the Parole Board in general. When they placed them all together, they tended to feed and reinforce each other's discontent.

Another was the Fruits of Islam, a Muslim group that is more simply known as the F.O.I. For a good part of 1989, this group had caused problems. They generally advocate racial hatred against whites and have a military style of leadership and organization. This group assaulted officers in the RHU and had been caught on the exercise yards, preaching, saluting each other, and having formations. By and large, they did not have a large following, but they presented a problem because of their organizational abilities.

The condition of the institution in the fall of 1989, therefore, was that it was overcrowded, with inexperienced staff where there was some general inmate unrest and one fairly militant group. There had also been some drop off in discipline and control.

¹See Appendix A for Trend Analysis

II. Chronology of Events

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

September 2, 1989:

Word was received that the F.O.I., who were again becoming militant, were going to stage a demonstration at an inmate state-wide track meet. The track meet was later cancelled, but inmates started talking about the possibility, even the inevitability, of a major disturbance, thus placing a bad idea in the wrong minds. Later this month, the Muslim chaplain allowed the F.O.I. to meet alone.

October 11, and 16, 1989:

Two policies, one restricting sick call to twice per week, the other prohibiting bringing food to family days were issued. This angered and alienated a broad range of inmates who came together in opposition to the new decrees. Both policies were seen as a loss, particularly access to medical personnel, and staff also voiced concern about the effect of these policies on the inmates.

October 21-22, 1989:

Over this weekend rumors of an impending disturbance were relayed to staff.

October 23, 1989 Monday:

There was a major disturbance at SCI Huntingdon which received wide media coverage and which stirred inmates at Camp Hill.

October 24, 1989 Tuesday:

J Ward had an unusually large sick line, which was an organized protest against the new medical policy. The administrative assistant also was confronted by 30 or so inmates protesting this. Some staff observed a drop off of attendance at main line and the inmate rumor mill became active by stating that the electric was going to be cut off during late evening hours so no one would be able to watch TV.

October 25, 1989 Wednesday:

At 2:45 p.m., while inmates were proceeding from the stockade yard to the group 2 and 3 wards, an officer asked an inmate who was proceeding to Group 1 for a pass. The inmate said there was no problem with this, walked a couple of steps and then sucker-punched the officer. This occurred at the E Block Gate House. A sergeant and two other officers intervened and were also assaulted by a large group of inmates. By this time calls went out from E Gate and Food Services to Control reporting the situation.

At Control, administrative staff, including the Major and Deputy for Operations, ordered all available manpower to E Gate, notified the State Police, put out a 911 call requesting municipal police to come and form a perimeter, gave tower officers orders to fire warning shots over any fallen officers, and gave orders to shoot to prevent any escapes. The rest of the institution was also ordered locked-down.

By this time, staff had arrived at E Gate, some of whom were assaulted. When the inmates saw commissioned officers and C.O.'s start arriving, they yelled "let's get the white hats." Although attempts were made to get the inmates to move, they refused. The injured officers were pulled back to the gate and E Gate was locked. Medical staff arrived to treat those who were hurt.

With E Gate closed, the inmates rushed in several other directions - to the blocks and to culinary. In E, F, G, H, J, and K Blocks, they overpowered the officers and took control. Some of the officers were able to prevent immediate capture by jumping in the switch box rooms and calling over the radio for help, but inmates using tools that they got from maintenance trucks were eventually able to break in and capture them. When the inmates took control of the officers, they removed their radios, keys, wallets and jewelry.

One of the officers was dragged out of K Ward and badly beaten by 15-20 inmates, but an officer from the Highway Tower fired a warning shot and the inmates scattered. On Wednesday night and again on the following night the hostages were treated brutally and similarly. They were guarded by F.O.I., pillowcases were placed over their heads, and instructions were given to kill the hostages when a whistle blew. They then blew whistles and beat them. Chain saws and blow torches were both run near them as if they were going to be attacked with these implements. The hostages were also moved around the institution, sometimes being beaten as they went. What the inmates were inflicting was psychological as well as physical torture.

Another group of inmates rushed Kitchen #2, smashing windows and attempting to break in. Fortunately the food service instructors had locked the doors earlier when they saw the yard was not in for early line. Six staff and about 30 inmates were in the building. They secured the area, then 20 inmates went with one food services instructor and escaped through the door by the dock. The other five staff locked themselves in the storage room in the basement of the building. By this time, the inmates had gained entrance to Kitchen #2 by what would become a familiar route of tearing out the air conditioner to gain access to the food services manager's office and rampaging through the building, including assaulting a food services officer. Five culinary officers in the basement called for help. A group of inmates descended into their area and looted the coolers. One inmate did try to break into the storage area to assault the officers, but was dissuaded by another to "leave my boss alone." Later a different group of inmates attempted to break through to capture the staff members, but they exited by an outside door where by this time State Police were stationed.

An activities specialist had assisted at E Gate, but eventually with five inmates retreated into the gym and locked it. He became an eye witness to several of the next events. The inmates made various attempts to break through E Gate, first by trying to smash and pry the gate with boards and other implements, then an inmate appeared with a gold colored key (paracentric key) that was used to open the pedestrian gate. This key was probably taken from the tradesman who was assaulted earlier. When the inmates were able to open the pedestrian gate, correctional personnel retreated back the walkway towards Control. Shot guns had been ordered to E Gate, but when E Gate was breached officers and arms were

stationed at the Main Gate, Rear Gate, and Highway Tower.

After penetrating E Gate, the inmates turned their attention to the Commissary where they started breaking windows. An International Scout was hot wired and used by one inmate to ram and break the Commissary door and a huge crowd rushed in, looted the area, severely assaulted an officer and set it on fire. The Commissary Officer was able to lock himself in the back bathroom with two inmates and was later rescued through an entrance door that linked the Commissary and the Education Building.

The inmate in the Scout then drove through the gate between the gym and the modular units, then continued to the stockade yard gate and tried to penetrate the perimeter fence by driving into it. He was able to puncture the first fence but was not able to get through the second barrier because the Scout got hung up on a cement abutment. This breach through the gates allowed other inmates to break into the back of Modular Unit 1 and take another hostage, whom they assaulted.

Eight officers and 19 inmates from Maintenance had retreated into the Electric Shop and locked the doors. Inmates tried to bang in these doors, again with the intent to assault and take hostage the maintenance personnel, but they all exited via a tunnel to the Powerhouse with their inmates. An electric maintenance truck had been parked at the top of the ramp, from which the inmates took tools which they later used to bust locks.

Other inmates attempted to break into the Education Building, but the Education Building Officer had secured the area when he heard radio transmissions about troubles at E Gate. After some tries at the door, the inmates were diverted by their greed to enter Commissary, and the attack on the Education Building stalled. About 200 inmates, who were cooperative, were in the building. Female employees were moved to a more secure area. When smoke from the burning Commissary started entering the building, the inmates were brought to the first floor and later evacuated to Yard #1 around 5:30 p.m. Women employees were escorted out around 5:00 p.m.

Using another vehicle, inmates penetrated the gate which allowed them to get into the furniture complex, trapping 12 inmates and four civilians inside. These inmates wanted no part of the disturbance either and actually procured riot sticks for C.I. staff and then locked themselves in the dry kiln room. Later on an inmate got the idea of getting a note to the State Police and a letter attached to a piece of masonry was thrown over the fence to Pennsylvania State Police officers notifying them that they were trapped in the building. Both staff and inmates were later rescued by State Police around 10:00 p.m. In the meantime, the rampaging inmates on the outside had fire bombed the Correctional Industries office.

One of the officers taken hostage from Mod #1 was taken to the gym to be secured by other inmates, but the 30 some inmates in there turned him over to staff. These three officers broke their keys off in the locks to prevent rioting inmates from entering, but the inmates still attempted to break into the activities area. Staff made their escape by removing the grill from an air vent which gave them access to the roof and later were rescued by a fire truck extension ladder around

8:00 p.m.

During this period of time, on Group 2-3 yard, inmates had brought hostages out who were beaten. Inmates were also seen assaulting each other.

Control had sent an emergency team to the Rear Gate where they assembled with the Pennsylvania State Police. At approximately 4:30 p.m. they entered the institution with a plan to first evacuate the Mod Unit inmates so that the assault force would not have any inmates at their backs. Following this, the plan was to envelop the E Gate area. The Modular Unit inmates, who were not recalcitrant, were placed in the stockade yard.

At approximately 5:00 p.m. the inmates by E Gate could see the Department of Corrections and PA State Police forces coming up the gym road, so they retreated back through E Gate and formed a barricade. From this time until around 7:30 p.m. there was a standoff by E Gate with inmates on one side and staff on the other. The inmates threw stones, bricks, oranges, even a meat cleaver over the fence at officers. Because the inmates had radios, they monitored and made their own transmissions, which were full of threats, making communications difficult.

The Deputy for Treatment had made contact with an inmate when he overheard a radio transmission. The inmate was demanding and wanted to see the Superintendent, the Commissioner and the Governor. Negotiations went on for about an hour when the deputy asking for a show of good faith by releasing injured officers, which was done, and two officers were released through E Gate, one of whom was pushed down in a cart. Another tradesman had earlier been released when inmates pushed him in an institution vehicle towards Control and then laid him on a grassy area beside the walkway.

The inmate negotiator had suggested to the Deputy for Treatment that there be face-to-face negotiations but they wanted to have five other inmates with them. He agreed to this and around 6:45 p.m. he and several staff members met with six inmates in a table that was set up in front of the Education Building. The inmates were brought through E Gate and searched prior to entering into negotiations. The inmates' demands included concerns about the family days and the medical policies and they also asked for the press and the Commissioner to be present, which was denied. They further wanted more access to the law library and had problems with the showers and the amount of time they were locked in their cells. It seemed that these inmates were confused about just what they did want. One inmate spokesman was the chief negotiator and obviously the leader. All of them were believed to be Muslims and their chief spokesman was an F.O.I leader.

While the negotiations were taking place, it was obvious that these inmate negotiators had no control over the events on the yard. A hostage was brought to the fence and threatened with death unless the PA Police backed off, other hostages were being brought out of the block, paraded around, and hit, one with a broom handle, and in general the inmates were continuing a rampage in the group 2-3 area. The Deputy for Treatment intervened to have one of the negotiators sent back to try to get control of this situation.

While this was going on, inmates had been secured in the group one cellblocks in the courtyards between B and C blocks. Some of these broke windows and set fire in C block basement by throwing lighted fluids through the window. Pennsylvania State Police and Corrections personnel stopped this and took control of approximately 150 inmates in the group one yard. These were moved to the end of the field where inmates were cuffed with flex-cuffs, from which some of them were able to free themselves.

The Deputy for Treatment concluded his hostage negotiations with the inmates agreeing to negotiate again the following day with the Superintendent and by also agreeing that sick line policies would not interfere with medical emergencies and that future policy changes would include inmate input. In return for this, the Deputy asked for the rest of the hostages to be released. The chief negotiator of the inmates went back into the group 2-3 area, spoke to other inmates for a half-hour to 45 minutes, and then returned to the E Gate house and spoke again to staff. He indicated the inmates would return to cells and that the hostages would be released, which is what occurred. The inmates were placed in E, F, G, H, J, and K Blocks into whatever cells seemed the most usable at the time, and other inmates were returned from the yard areas to the Mod Units and other cell blocks.

The inmates had thoroughly trashed Group 2 and 3 wards, and the wreckage littered the corridors, which were also slippery. Because the lights had been broken, the wards were dim and visibility was poor. Inmates were in possession of tools, radios and keys and, what would prove fatal - the cell locks were not secure. Several officers noted that the rod box panel covers were missing above the cells, which would allow inmates to reach up and release the latch in the locking mechanism. Through the night inmates would be seen out of their cells. A count was ordered and attempted four to five times but had not come out correctly and could not be cleared.

Inmates were fed between 3 and 4 a.m. Several officers objected, and some refused to do this because they were uncertain about the security of the cells and because they didn't want to feed someone who had just rioted. Counselors and psychologists also went through the blocks around 3 a.m. and noted that the PA State Police had been pulled and that officers were in front of the blocks instead of inside because they were afraid of the inmates letting themselves out of their cells. All sorts of contraband littered the area and the cell blocks.

By the end of Wednesday evening 35 staff had been injured, some quite seriously, and 12 had been taken hostage. Thirty-one had been trapped in various places throughout the institution. Nine (9) inmates had also been injured. Fire had destroyed the Commissary, Furniture Factory office complex, E Gate House, equipment shed and Dispensary #2.

The events of Wednesday, October 25, 1989 appear to have been spontaneous, but it should be mentioned that some information from inmates indicated it may have been planned.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1989

At 1:00 p.m. the administration met with six (6) inmate representatives, all of

whom were Muslims and all of whom had met with the Deputy for Treatment on Wednesday evening. Again the leader was an F.O.I. member. Several demands were made but the only assurance the staff could give them was that the line of communications would be open and that their demands would be considered. What the inmates wanted were: more educational programs, better medical treatment, better food, family days to continue as before, better shower conditions, yard activities on Sunday morning, all blocks to be open the same as K Block (honor ward), better treatment from officers, and an increase in half-way house placement and furloughs, more adequate dental care, assurances that lights would not be turned off after midnight, and grievance meetings once a month.

When the inmate negotiators were escorted back to the blocks, they made several comments about "something is going to happen tonight."

During the day time hours, several staff reported the inmates as being quiet, almost unusually quiet, although there was a lot of chatter about visits, medical lines, and threats like "it's not over yet." Staff were asked to take some inmates out to start a clean up but they refused to do this because of security concerns. Also during the day RHU inmates started participating in the general unrest by setting small fires. Around 6:00 p.m. the inmates watched the Superintendent on TV and then they started yelling because they didn't like what they heard.

At approximately 7:00 p.m. officers stated over the radio that the inmates were coming out of the cells in group 2 and 3 area. They were told to lock the blocks and leave, and several made their escape through E Gate. The inmates simultaneously escaped from the blocks, releasing those who could not get out of their cells and overpowering the officers. Some inmates got out by releasing the latch in the locking mechanism above their cell door. Others went to the switch boxes and pulled the levers that unlocked all the cell doors. Every indication is that this part of the disturbance was planned, as the F.O.I. had grabbed power and were dictating to the other inmates. Inmates ran through the blocks telling others to come out of their cells or they would be considered as being for staff and against inmates.

Because E Gate had been destroyed, the inmates poured through there, attacked and torched the modular units, beating up several modular unit inmates, and then commenced an assault on the Control Center. After breaking the Carpentry Shop windows, they tossed mop heads soaked with gas into it, chain sawed their way into the auditorium and burnt that also.

When the inmates attacked the Control Center, the Deputy for Operations, Major, a Captain, and the Director of Treatment, along with several other staff members, some of whom had escaped from the group 2-3 area, were trapped inside. Inmates set fire and were able to gain entry to the building by tearing out an air conditioner in the deputy's office. They also got on the roofs of Group 1 and gained entry to C Block by sledge hammering through a window, then releasing inmates there, who destroyed the block. Inmates also got into C Block basement.

A force of approximately 25 Pennsylvania State Police and some corrections officers began clearing and securing the area in front of the Main Gate and were

able to assist the staff trapped in the Control Center by giving them weapons, and when fire personnel arrived, removed them via a ladder. A perimeter line of Department of Corrections staff and police was strung out in a rough line in front of the Control Center. In front of them were a mob of inmates throwing stones, pieces of brick, and other things at them. The inmates made a tentative rush, but tear gas and warning shots were fired and the inmates retreated back towards group 3. At this time, inmates were also on the roofs of Group 2 and 3 and throwing Molotov cocktails and other objects at the officers. Outside police agencies had assembled and were manning the perimeter, fire agencies were brought in to quell the flames and the Pennsylvania State Police helicopter monitored the area and covered the police as they moved to secure other parts of the compound.

An officer reported that inmates were trying to gain access to his tower behind the kitchen, and inmates had to be chased away from this area and placed under guard.

Many inmates were becoming coming scared during this time and surrendered and were escorted and secured at the Main Gate area. One hostage was also released and other officers, some dressed in inmate clothing, made it to the Main Gate.

A Lieutenant overheard a radio transmission from an inmate stating that two hostages were going to be killed. The Lieutenant talked to the inmates for over a half-hour. They made all sorts of demands, including having Amnesty International come in, but they were also able to give the names of four of the hostages whom they held, which indicated that they were in some type of control. The Lieutenant reported to the Command Center, and eventually two Pennsylvania State Police negotiators and the Lieutenant went to the fence by K Block and were approached by two inmates, one of whom was an F.O.I. leader and the chief negotiator from previous times. A phone connection was set up and negotiations started. At this time, the Deputy for Treatment was also stationed there as a forward observer. The major demand at this time was to talk to the Governor and/or the Commissioner regarding the situation. The Commissioner stated he would only meet with the inmates under the condition that all hostages be released and that order be restored to the institution. Basically the negotiations went on through the evening and reached several impasses but did serve the purpose of stalling the inmates.

During this period of time, fires were flaring in the institution and inmates were running throughout the compound, setting fires and destroying property. They were using gas from the shops as a propellant. They also began to fortify the gate between the Gymnasium and the Commissary and set much flammable material there as a trap for any kind of entry, the plan being to set the gate ablaze if an assault was made in that area. They used plywood, flake board, benches, 2 x 4's, and soaked them all in gas. They had also by this time burnt down the tea and coffee shop and blew up an oxygen tank that knocked out one of the walls of the furniture factory.

A plan was set up to use three columns of State Police to assault the positions in Group 2 and 3. One column of State Police was stationed on a line facing E Gate as a diversionary force, and they made a movement toward that area, and

shouted and screamed, distracting the inmates. The two other columns commenced an assault at approximately 6:30 a.m., one group through the kitchen, the other over the gym road, thus catching the inmates in a pincer movement. In order to get the troopers into the area, a fire in the Kitchen had to be extinguished and a truck was used to ram through the gym road gate. When the assault force entered the Group 2-3 area, the inmates started pelting them with rocks and with other debris. At this point, shots were fired and four inmates were wounded, after which the other inmates scattered into the blocks.

During the advance, the chief negotiator from the inmates said that he had killed one hostage, and that he would kill the other if the Pennsylvania State Police did not retreat, after which the phone line went dead. At this point, from the tower area, the Deputy for Treatment noted that white sheets and towels were being hung out of the block windows, which meant that several of the inmates wanted to surrender. It was decided to announce to the inmate that they could surrender by proceeding into the yard area and lay face down on the ground. At first they tried to use a bull horn from the helicopter but the noise drowned out the transmissions. A hand held hailer was then tried but it did not have enough volume. Finally, a Pennsylvania State Police vehicle was brought to the Highway Tower and an announcement over the cruiser's hailer was made for the inmates to surrender. Eventually the inmates began to come out of E Block and the other blocks followed shortly afterwards. Officers also were released out of the blocks, dressed in inmate clothing. The inmates were laid on their bellies and eventually evacuated to the stockade yard area. Pennsylvania State Police and institution personnel made a sweep of the blocks and all hostages were released. The institution was secure by 10:00 a.m.

By the end of the day thirty-four staff and 32 inmates were injured and five (5) hostages had been taken but all had been released. Several of the hostages had been severely abused and brutalized.

The Central Office Emergency Management Team was partially activated on Thursday at 7:00 p.m. by central office personnel. It was at this point that other Department of Corrections personnel were instructed to report to Camp Hill to assist in the emergency.

Over the next several days, inmates were processed back into the blocks that had been cleared and others were transferred to SCI Waymart, SRCF Mercer, SCI Smithfield, SCI Pittsburgh, SCI Graterford and into the Federal system. Immediately following the incident, business office staff and counselors had manned the phones in the institution with lists of those who were injured for inquiring families. By Monday, a list was prepared of where inmates were transferred to and counselors started notifying families.

To secure the blocks, two separate chains and two separate locks were placed on the cell doors.

III. Analysis of the Disturbance

ANALYSIS OF THE DISTURBANCE

It is difficult to critique the handling of the disturbance because things as usual are much clearer after the fact than they were before. Disastrous as the riot was, it is little short of miraculous that no human life was lost. However there were certain areas that could have been addressed that might have tempered or better controlled the violent inmate response.

The two policies on medical lines and family visits were issued too close together and were not adequately explained to the inmates. In fact, one of the policies on family days actually increased those visits. Because the inmates did not understand this and because they saw the policies as two major losses, it united them with one common grievance.

Emergence of the F.O.I. as leaders was dangerous. Although they most likely did not create the first night's events, they certainly planned and pushed the other inmates into exiting their cells on the second evening of the riot. In retrospect, these men, particularly the chief negotiator, could have been placed in restrictive custody at an earlier date.

During the three to four days prior to the disturbance there were a lot of rumors of unhappiness in general population and the inmates were looking for answers. At this time, the block should have been saturated with staff, both custodial and treatment, to explain the policies, stop the rumors and generally assure the inmates that matters would be worked out and that staff was in control. However, there was no intervention here and without staff to do the interpreting, the F.O.I. seized the opportunity to put their own version on the events.

Once the uprising started, staff, State Police and local law enforcement agencies and fire companies actually handled the situation quite well, when one considers that during this there were no escapes, no lives lost, and the that the loss of property could have been much more extensive. However, the second night of rioting may have been avoided if staff had realized the extent to which the locking mechanisms were damaged.

Another difficulty is that manpower tended to get lost and thus orders and directions sometimes were not known.

A final problem is that the command post is in a vulnerable area which was later attacked and compromised. That type of center should be outside of the institution.

IV. Recommendations

RECOMMENDATIONS

Category I, Physical Plant

- A. When air conditioners are installed, security bars or security screening should be placed around the air conditioner.
- B. Wooden doors in vital areas should be replaced by grill doors or security doors.
- C. In sensitive areas, door hinges should be on the inside to prevent inmates from taking them off and gaining entry.
- D. Key drop boxes should be placed in the blocks so that officers could get rid of their keys during a disturbance, and inmates could not get them.
- E. All Class A tools should be kept outside the institution and all Class B tools should be in secure areas or tool cribs.
- F. Main supply of flammable liquids should be kept outside the institution and brought in on a limited basis.
- G. Control Centers should be fortified or placed in an area so that they cannot be penetrated by inmates. Records offices should be outside the institution if possible or at least be invulnerable to inmates.
- H. Camp Hill specifically, and with other institutions where it is applicable, zoning should be considered to limit the ability of inmates to unite together in one area.
- I. Utilities like electric and water should be zoned so that they could be cut off for separate areas.
- J. Highly flammable modular units should no longer be purchased.
- K. The Department should consider placing rifles on towers, but officers would have to qualify and disintegrating ammunition would have to be used.
- L. Key control policy needs to be reevaluated at Camp Hill because there are too many keys inside the institution.
- M. Emergency lighting that is portable should be available.
- N. In Camp Hill in particular, the medical department needs grill doors or security doors to protect the drug room and dispensary from the waiting area. All traffic through this area needs to be evaluated because it is too heavy.

- O. Vehicle policies should be reevaluated to minimize the number of vehicles that are inside the institution.

Emergency Plan

- A. "All call" telephone lines should be placed in institutions so that several areas can be notified of an emergency at once.
- B. Portable radios with separate frequencies are needed with emergencies so the inmates cannot monitor them. There should be enough of these radios to issue to outside agencies so that there is one common communication band.
- C. When other institutions send their emergency teams in it reduces the amount of emergency equipment available at those institutions. We suggest that central office have a mobile unit with emergency equipment that can be moved to the site of an emergency. These could also be located regionally.
- D. Management at an institution that is having a disturbance cannot function effectively past a certain time because of fatigue, and Camp Hill's top administrators were on duty to the point where they were exhausted. After twelve (12) hours of a riot situation, a team of staff from central office should at the Commissioner's order be brought to the scene to help support institution management.
- E. A manpower coordinator should be specified who would monitor all incoming manpower from institutions and other agencies. This person could be used to set up relief support shifts, notify command post of available manpower and to provide accommodations.
- F. There should be a post emergency riot plan or checklist for management to review and be prepared for the different contingencies that will arise, including a security check of the entire institution, debriefing, and contacting of families of staff and inmates.
- G. Staff must be made to understand that incident reports must be written immediately following a disturbance.
- H. The department might want to consider a study of canine programs that are used in other states to see how it could be used in Pennsylvania.
- I. Emergency response teams should be enlarged.

Staffing

- A. Staff should be filled to 100% of the approved complement.
- B. Overtime should be authorized to fill staff to complement so that there are no security posts vacant on any one shift.
- C. Vacancies should be filled as soon as possible.

- D. Deputy Superintendent for Operations should be removed from the state-wide grievance hearings since it removes him too often from the institution.
- E. C.O.II's should be chosen by management utilizing the rule of three.
- F. Time clocks should be installed in all institutions so that both daily and during emergencies staff can be accounted for.

Inmate Management

- A. The policy that any inmate groups not be allowed to hold meetings should be enforced.
- B. There should be a decrease in inmate idle time and conversely an increase in education, vocational, and other programs so they can occupy their time productively and prepare themselves for society.
- C. We should encourage the Parole Board to expedite the handling of parole violators and educate staff that early reviews can be requested for these inmates.
- D. There is a need for more RHU space.
- E. Pay scales should be adjusted so that inmates on idle do not make as much as inmates who are assigned in the lower grades. This current system encourages idleness.
- F. Camp Hill institution should be placed on Unit Management, which will unite the treatment and custody staffs and break down the institution into smaller units.
- G. When staff changes policies that affect the inmates, it should be announced over closed circuit TV and explained by staff prior to implementation.
- H. Passage of the Good Time Bill should be considered to give the inmates incentive and reduce overcrowding.
- I. The grievance system should not negatively impact upon the duties of custodial personnel.
- J. Inmate line movements should be staggered and tightly controlled.

Training

- A. Emergency response teams should be given more training, and particularly be introduced to difficulties that happen with planned riots.
- B. There should be a specific course set up in Human Relations to teach officers and other staff how to deal more effectively with inmates.

Specifically, staff who have problems with inmates should be sent through this course.

- C. Lieutenants should complete supervisory training prior to assuming their duties.
- D. Training sergeants should become a separate position so they can devote full time to train on both day time and evening shifts. A training sergeant should be signed separately to a 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. and a 2:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. shift.
- E. The use of force or hands on policy, especially the physical handling of inmates in RHU, needs to be clarified at Camp Hill.

Statistics

A package should be developed by central office that combines monthly reports to come up with indicators of inmate unrest or pending trouble.

Appendix A - Trend Analysis

TREND ANALYSIS: SCI CAMP HILL

October 1988 to September 1989

The inmate population increased by 4 percent from October 1988 to September 1989. No severe or rapid increases were noted in population. SCI Camp Hill remained at approximately 145 percent of capacity during the twelve month period (see Figure 1).

Quarter 1 (January/March) to Quarter 2 (April/June)

| Overtime Hours

- 28 percent decrease in overtime hours due to the implementation of electronic surveillance fencing system and the unmanning of several security towers (see Figure 2).

| Personnel Action

- 43 percent increase in total administrative personnel actions (i.e., employee terminations, disciplinary action, and first step grievances), chiefly fueled by a 90 percent increase in line staff terminations (see Figure 3).

| Inmate Misconducts

- 20 percent increase in the number of misconducts written by line staff (see Figure 4).
- 21 percent increase in the number of misconduct charges written by line staff (see Figure 4).
- 23 percent increase in misconduct charges for perceived hostility toward line staff (i.e., threatening a staff member, assaulting staff, interfering with security activity, and refusing an order) (see Figure 5).
- 37 percent increase in reported assaults on custody staff requiring medical treatment (see Figure 6).
- Low Restricted Housing Unit placement for guilty misconducts compared to other institutions of similar size and inmate composition (see Figure 7).

Quarter 2 (April/June) To Quarter 3 (July/September)

| Inmate Misconducts

- 12 percent decrease in the number of misconducts written by line staff (see Figure 4).
- 12 percent decrease in the number of misconduct charges written by line staff (see Figure 4).
- 27 percent decrease in the number of misconducts written for hostility toward line staff (i.e., threatening a staff member, assaulting staff, interference with security activity, and refusing an order) (see Figure 5).

| Sick Leave


- 29 percent increase in sick leave reported by line staff (see Figure 2).

| Inmate Grievances

- 62 percent increase in total number of inmate grievances (see Figure 8).
- 116 percent increase in grievances for staff harrassment. (see Figure 8)

Figure 1

SCI Camp Hill
Population Trends
Oct 1988 to Sept 1989




Inmate Population

— No of Inmates

Figure 2

SCI Camp Hill
Sick Leave and Overtime Hours
Oct 1988 to Sept 1989



— Sick Leave Hrs — Overtime Hrs

Figure 3

SCI Camp Hill
 Personnel Action
 Oct 1988 to Sept 1989






Figure 4


SCI Camp Hill
 Inmate Misconduct Charges and Outcome
 Oct 1988 to Sept 1989



— Charges □ Guilty ▨ Not Guilty

Figure 5


SCI Camp Hill
 Selected Inmate Misconducts on Staff
 Oct 1988 to Sept 1989



— Threatened Staff — Assault on Staff
 — Security Interference — Refusing an Order

Figure 6

SCI Camp Hill
 Inmate Assaults
 Oct 1988 to Sept 1989



Nature of Assault

- Inmate to Inmate
- + Inmate to Cust Staff
- + Inmate to Tx Staff


Based on Morbidity Report

Figure 7
SCI Camp Hill
Monthly Misconduct Hearing Statistics

	<u>Apr/Jun</u>	<u>Jul/Sep</u>
Camp Hill		
Charges	2226	2027
% Guilty	78%	73%
% RHU Plcmt	22%	14%
Dallas		
Charges	1649	1606
% Guilty	94%	91%
% RHU Plcmt	19%	21%
Graterford		
Charges	2324	2405
% Guilty	41%	43%
% RHU Plcmt	--	--
Huntingdon		
Charges	1920	2269
% Guilty	64%	68%
% RHU Plcmt	44%	29%
Rockview		
Charges	1390	1503
% Guilty	78%	72%
% RHU Plcmt	22%	21%

Figure 8

SCI Camp Hill
 Inmate Grievances by Type
 Oct 1988 to Sept 1989



THEORIES

A. Control Theory:

Each unique group in an organization or system plays a defined role with a defined level of control. Disruptions in control or the demonstrated means of control within or between groups will impact behavior displayed by other groups in the system, as they seek to regain their perceived level of control. In time, if the group realizes no increase in its level of actual or perceived control, it may retreat from the system to avoid confrontation and reduce frustration.

- Decrease human control via use of electronic fencing and increased personnel terminations.
- Staff seeks to increase control or perceived human control over inmates by increasing misconduct write-ups.
- Staff perceives lack of support for increased control as RHU placements for misconducts continue at a low rate.
- Staff avoids what is perceived to be a potentially uncontrollable situation by increasing use of sick leave and decreasing misconduct write-ups for inmates.

B. Social Power Theory

Each group in an organization or system has a specific level of power which it can impose on other groups within the system. When one group displays a level of power over a lesser group, the lesser group, in turn, demonstrates its power over a still lesser group. In time, if the group realizes no increase in its level of power, it may retreat from the system to avoid confrontation and reduce frustration.

- Administration demonstrates power over line staff by decreasing overtime hours and increasing personnel terminations.
- Line staff seeks to demonstrate power over the inmates by increasing inmate misconducts reports.
- Line staff retreats from power struggle by decreasing misconducts and increasing sick leave.
- Inmates seek to relieve discomfort created by increased misconducts by increasing inmate grievances.

Appendix B - Physical Plant Report

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Cumberland County

Physical Plant Riot Inspection Report
State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill, PA

Table of Contents

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General Construction Description	Page	3
Report Summary	Pages	4 thru 5
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Drawings	Pages	9 thru 14
Reconstruction Recommendations	Pages	15 thru 16
Remarks	Page	17

History of the Present SCI-Camp Hill Facility

This facility was constructed during the years from 1938 to 1940 as the "Pennsylvania Industrial School for Boys." The facility was to house juvenile offenders between 15 and 18 years of age. The buildings constructed during the 1938-40 construction period included all Physical Plant structures with the exception of the following and construction completion dates:

Construction Completion Dates

Blacksmith Shop	1943
Laundry	1948
Guest House	1953
Education Building	1961
Chapel	1964
Central Office	1968
Water Plant	1972
Freight Terminal	1973
E Gatehouse	1985
New Rear Gate	1989
Second Perimeter Fence	1986
Fence Detection System	1989

The freight terminal, perimeter fence, and fence detection system were constructed by outside contract. All other structures were constructed by the SCI-Camp Hill maintenance staff with the use of inmate labor who had been highly shop trained in all of the construction trades.

During the years after original construction many of the areas designated for a special use were relocated and reconstructed with the addition of new structures.

Front entrances to the cell blocks were the same, as now can be seen at the entrances to the present gymnasium and auditorium. Glass block was removed and window frames installed in the entrances and side wall areas during the years between 1960 and 1965. The block replacement was necessitated because of the glass block grout joints continually loosening due to poor construction installation.

General Construction Description

Type of construction refers to the building material used in the construction of that building. Following is the classification of the buildings constructed at the SCI-Camp Hill facility.

All original buildings are constructed of structural steel. Floors are of concrete construction. Roof construction is of eight (8) inch structural tile, covered with 2" of concrete, 1" insulation, and a 4-ply built-up roof covered with roof slag for protection from the elements. (See Drawings #1 & #6)

Exterior cell block walls are 1'-2" thick, constructed of one thickness of 4" brick and two of 4" structural clay tile. Partition walls between cells and pipe chase are of 4" tile, with no reinforcing of steel or concrete. The exterior wall is a supporting wall for all cell block floors, with interior cell block entrance partitions supported by structural steel and reinforced concrete. (See Drawings #2, #3 & #4)

D-Ward (Restricted Housing Unit) is the same type of material construction as other cell blocks. The block layout differs from all other cell blocks. The cells are back to back, with the cell corridor being between the exterior walls of the cells and exterior wall. Cell partition walls are 6" thick, constructed of one 2" and 4" structural tile. (See Drawing #5)

All second level cell block ceilings are of lath and plaster, and are dropped 2'-2" + below the main roof inner surface. All hot water circulating lines are housed in this area. These circulating lines furnish instant hot water to all cell sink units throughout the physical plant. (See Drawing #2)

SCI-Utilities


Heating - The electrical power to the facility is supplied by an outside source to the facility power distribution system located in the electrical distribution room of the boiler plant. Distribution voltage is 2300 volts and distributed to high voltage transformer rooms located throughout the facility. Electrical switch gear has been renewed and all underground distribution lines (high voltage) replaced. Most high voltage, oil type transformers are from original construction. The overall electrical distribution system can be considered to be in excellent condition.

Water Distribution - The facility is equipped with a clarifying/flocculating type water system. The plant was constructed in 1970. The system has supplied as much as 750,000 gallons of water a day to the facility. The average monthly usage is 15,000,000 gallons.


Report Summary

The physical plant was in good condition before the time of the riot situation created on the days of October 25 and 26. Below is an overall description of the damages to each of the building structures and needed repairs to place the structures in their original condition before the time of the riot situation:

<u>Building</u>	<u>Structural Steel Damage</u>	<u>Damage</u>
Hospital		None
D-Block	None	
<u>Remarks</u> - Miscellaneous structural tiles have been smashed at cell block pipe chase areas to access the cell to the main corridor area.		
A-Block	None	None
Group #1 Kitchen and Dining Area	None	None
Auto Shop	None	See Remarks
<u>Remarks</u> - Entrance door damaged by forced entry.		
Blacksmith Shops	None	None
Boiler Plant	None	None
Greenhouse	See Remarks	
<u>Remarks</u> - Recommend complete demolition.		
Laundry	None	None
Education Building	None	See Remarks
<u>Remarks</u> - Extensive damage to commissary and construction cluster section. Rebuild construction cluster building to its original state. Extensive smoke damage to all floors of building. Auditorium of Education Building severely damaged. No structural damage apparent. Roof replacement will be necessary.		
Chapel	None	None
#2 Food Service and Dining Room	None	See Remarks
<u>Remarks</u> - Extensive damage to kitchen equipment, doors and door frames. Refrigerant lines have been damaged. Overall, the damage to Food Service area is light, and this area could be put back in working condition with outside contract in a period between two (2) to four (4) months.		




D-BLOCK - TILE REPLACEMENT
TIER 4 CELL 27-28



D-BLOCK - TILE REPLACEMENT
TIER II - CELL 16



"E" GATE/GATEHOUSE



EDUCATION BLDG. CONSTRUCTION CL:
FROM EXTERICR




BLDON - CELL 1 & 5 TIER II
FRON INSIDE CELL




"B" WARD
CONTROL CENTER




"B" WARD
CORRIDOR



"B" WARD
CABLE CHASE



"A" WARD - ABOVE CELL
CELL 5 - TIER III



"G" WARDS - LOCK RODS
CELL 7-8 TIER III



Reconstruction Recommendations

Construction recommendations are being based on the Camp Hill Correctional facility being used as a medium plus/maximum minus type housing unit. As was stated earlier in this report, the facility and housing units were constructed for juvenile age offenders and over the past years the facility has slowly changed from housing the juvenile type inmate to its present use, which can be classified as medium plus//low maximum.

The major areas of security concerns in the housing units at this time are the mechanical locking devices and the structural tile wall construction of the cell block.

The following recommendations are being made to change cell block security from the present minimum type construction to the needed medium plus/low maximum security level:

1. Construct new control centers in the center of each block with a security wall in the center of the block. This basically will separate the present block into two (2) 60/65-man blocks supervised from one (1) control center. The control center will have both an interior and an exterior entrance with a closed-in walkway between the cell blocks.
2. Install necessary exterior entrances to meet life safety code requirements in all cell blocks.
3. Discontinue use of the present gang showers and place new showers on both levels near the control center area to permit individual showering throughout the day. Remodel present shower rooms for storage space.
4. Replace the present mechanical locking device with the Folger-Adams or equal K-R locking device, permitting double locking of all cell doors. All new exterior doors will have both a mechanical and electrical operating device.
5. Cell Walls - Reinforce present cell walls with fourteen gauge sheet steel on corridor side of cell, and place sheet steel on cell partition every sixth cell. Outside cell walls should be sufficient for medium type security unless inmate has possession of contraband tools or proper cell block supervision is not in place.
6. Interior Security Fences - Install additional double fence and perimeter lighting at the original security fence line to place the main stockade field and boiler plant outside the double fence. At the present security level and under the circumstances which existed during the riot, inmates could have easily taken over the boiler plant and electrical switchgear in the plant, which could have placed the heating and electrical systems out of working condition. (See drawing #1)

Install interior security fencing to restrict inmate flow to confined areas, as seen necessary. All interior fencing should be fourteen (14) feet in height, with the bottom half consisting of two (2) inch diamond mesh, and the top half should have 3/8 inch security mesh.

7. Maintenance Shops - Construct new maintenance building outside the perimeter fence in the area adjacent to the present Correctional Industries' freight building.
8. Present Security Windows - Present security windows throughout the facility can easily be breached by sawing through window bars or bending out same with as little as a 12" pipe wrench. Window replacement may be necessary to reclassify this facility from a maximum to a medium-high/low-man facility.
9. The present control facility is inadequate for the present facility classification, and a new control facility should be constructed and incorporated with the main gate entrance to the SCI-Camp Hill facility.

Remarks

This writer wishes to express his opinion to the fact that should all the recommendations suggested in this report take place, he feels under the circumstances which occurred during the nights of October 25 and October 26, and the amount of security keys which were in the possession of the inmates, it would be possible for the same situation to reoccur.


It should also be noted that the present security key control at this facility can be considered no higher than minimum control, with security-type keys available to many personnel throughout the facility. This situation has existed over the past twenty to twenty-five years.

Training of new personnel, after completing training at the Corrections' Academy should include a much longer period of time at their newly assigned facility. All new personnel, regardless of classification, should receive at least two (2) weeks of training at their new facility before being assigned permanent duty. Many personnel do not receive the proper orientation to familiarize them with the complete layout of the physical plant.


It is hopeful that this report will serve some purpose in the reclassification of this facility from a minimum security to a medium/maximum type facility.

Appendix C - Map of Camp Hill

1. Disturbance starts at E Gate
2. Inmates gain control of Blocks E-F-G-H-J-K.
3. Then crash through E Gate. Attack Education Building Loot and burn Commissary
4. Inmates also gain entry to Dining Room and fire-bomb furniture factory
5. Inmates retreat through E Gate when they see PSP force.
6. Negotiations held in front of Ed. Bldg.



S.C.I.
CAMP HILL




WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1989

S.C.I.
CAMP HILL



1. Inmates simultaneously escaped from cells and gain control of cell blocks
2. Inmates attack mods and Control Center.
3. PSP and correctional staff enter from Main Gate to clear inmates away from control area.
4. Negotiations start with inmates from Highway Tower
5. Inmates controlled in Group I yard.



6. Friday a.m. one column makes a faked and diversionary assault
7. Two other columns actually attack through kitchen and gym rear gate
8. Inmates surrender
9. And moved to Main Stockade Field, from where they were later returned to secured blocks or shipped to other institutions.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1989

B

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO DISTURBANCE

Like all the Pennsylvania state correctional institutions, Camp Hill was beset with overcrowding, double celling and an increase in psychiatric, difficult to manage inmates. It had added 843 to its population since 1983 bringing the total to 2613 inmates in September 1989.

Camp Hill also had an unfortunate history. A serious disturbance in 1983 had been quelled but allegations of inmate abuse arose and ended up in a protracted and painful investigation. In 1986 the institution lost two experienced deputy superintendents and several other staff to new institutions, the latter being replaced by trainees. At the time of this disturbance, 47% of the Corrections Officers on the 6 a.m. to 2 p.m. shift had less than five (5) years experience and 67% of the C.O.'s on the 2 p.m. to 10 p.m. shift had less than five (5) years experience. In 1987 several commissioned officers were terminated and disciplined following a beating of an inmate who had assaulted them in the RHU yard. To many correctional staff this event left a lasting impression of abandonment by an administration who had no other choice but to enforce discipline.

Camp Hill was also a house divided against itself. Both on the vertical level up the chain-of-command and on the horizontal level across departments, there were wide divisions that impeded communications and often paralyzed decision making and reduced the amount and effectiveness of supervision. As staff separated from each other, so they also backed off the inmates leaving them with less restraints.

At the top was a Superintendent who was seen as distant and inaccessible because he didn't spend much time within the institution and because he tended to rule the two main divisions, treatment and operations, only through his deputies. He was an active manager who wanted to attack problems and be innovative, but his isolation forced him to make decisions based on incomplete and often erroneous information.

Both deputies came to Camp Hill with maximum security experience. Both saw difficulties and flaws, particularly security ones, in how the institution was run and both acted to tighten up what they saw as a loose orison. Their intent was admirable, but they attempted to do so much too quickly and made the mistake of trying to remake Camp Hill in the image of other prisons, thus ignoring that the institution had a history and a way of doing things that should have been worked through instead of against. In particular, the deputies, distrusting those beneath them, tended to take decision making away from others and hoard power and authority themselves. Because both deputies were viewed as overbearing and abrasive, they were widely disliked, and because the Superintendent did not exert much control over them, they ranged where they liked, even encroaching on each other's territories.

In matter of fact, the deputies did have a lot of personnel problems that needed correcting because there had been a lot of misbehavior between staff, including drunkenness and sleeping on duty, fights, theft, drug sales, and even sexual contacts with inmates. These indiscretions were correctly and appropriately

punished, but other disciplinary actions took place that were seen as heavy-handed and unfair, and fact finding sessions came to be perceived, by line staff, as arbitrary and harsh.

Some middle management positions were bypassed and made ineffectual, thus fragmenting the chain-of-command. For instance, one deputy dealt directly with Lieutenants and Captains instead of the Major, and he also went below the maintenance manager. Other supervisors became worried about being seconded or punished for their suggestions so many of them guessed on their decisions or withdrew into complacency. A resistance to the administration grew which was reflected by an inattention to policy and a laissez-faire attitude.

Because many middle managers had been rendered powerless, they reduced the supervision of those below them, sympathizing with rank and file instead of with the administration and feeding into the general discontent. Supervision became lax, particularly over corrections officers, and certain areas of inmate discipline were relaxed, notably regarding contraband and inmate movement. It also became easy for department heads to blame all unpopular decisions on the deputies and to avoid decisions by bucking them upwards, it being easier to wait for direction instead of risking oneself.

The rift was also across and within departments. There was an ongoing problem between C.O.'s and medical over inmates going to the dispensary, culinary personnel resented what they saw as a lack of custodial supervision at meal lines and the diagnostic center was under fire from several directions. Within custody, there were disputes among commissioned officers that would flare up even during the disturbance.

As a result of these divisions, communications on all levels broke down. Staff didn't report or make suggestions because they were afraid of being punished or ignored; directions that came down were often resisted. Decision making by some was avoided lest the choice be wrong, and supervision of rank and file became looser. Management tried to deal with the difficulties by promulgating new policies and using the disciplinary system, but what was being directed and said at the top, was skewed, resisted, or ignored as it made its way down, so there was a stalemate. Thus, the staff situation by the fall of 1989 was hardly one to manage a crisis and the same management problems occurred during the riot as were apparent before.

By every indicator, the inmates at Camp Hill had it pretty good. It is true that overcrowding had resulted in less than adequate shower facilities, long waiting lists for programs, more rushed meal lines and a lot of idle time, which did cause unrest, but on the other hand, there were a wide variety of educational and counseling opportunities and detailed plans had been made for more programming, increased telephone availability and the state-of-the-art gym. In fact, many staff grumbled that the administration was pro-inmate in giving them too much.

The problem was that, just as staff had become split up from each other they also began backing off the inmates. Because counselors stopped picking up request slips in the wards, they were no longer available to see inmates in the housing units. In order to provide more coverage over time, sergeants had been assigned

to two instead of one housing unit, thus decreasing staff contact and making the inmates more anonymous. As a result of the demoralization of C.O. staff, more inmate behavior was tolerated to avoid hassling with the inmates. Even though Camp Hill staff wrote a lot of misconducts, they would often fail to issue these because they saw the disciplinary system as ineffective. In fact, they had a legitimate grievance because Camp Hill was placing less inmates in RHU than comparable institutions. The result was the overlooking of some rule infractions, which removed control from the inmates.¹

Beginning in the Spring of 1989, there are statistical indicators that as staff became more stressed, so did inmates. From April through July 1989, staff terminations, grievances, and disciplinary action increased and at the same time overtime decreased (because of the demanning of the towers). Following this, sick leave increased, perhaps as a reaction to the adverse personnel actions. Thus staff was becoming unhappy and making less money in the bargain. At the same time, inmate misconducts and grievances go up, particularly those involving direct staff inmate conflict, like assaults and charges of harassment. Whether staff had a lower tolerance and wrote more misconducts or whether inmates, feeling the limits gradually removed them, acted out more is not known, but the situation was one of increased volatility. In late summer staff, perceiving a lack of administrative support as indicated by lowwvr RHU placements and perhaps perceiving a lack of control removed themselves by increased use of sick leave and decreased use of misconducts.²

Among the inmates, there were two particularly troubled groups. One was the parole violators, 200 of whom were housed together in E Ward. They were angry about not being able to work, about the delay in being classified, about too much idle time, and about the Parole Board in general.

Another was the Fruits of Islam, a Muslim group that is more simply known as the F.O.I. For a good part of 1989 this group had caused problems. In January 1989 a contract minister had preached racial hatred against whites during an Islamic service in the chapel. It is this militancy against whites and the military style of leadership and organization that distinguishes the F.O.I. from other Muslim sects. They had also assaulted officers in the RHU by throwing plumbing acid on them, and had been meeting on the exercise yard, where they preached, saluted each other, and placed inmate guards over their proceedings. Camp Hill administration tried to disband the group by the usual methods, but a new Muslim chaplain was hired who complicated their efforts. By his anti-administration stance and complaints of mistreatment and racism, this staff member may have legitimized the complaints of all the Muslim groups, and by his allowing the F.O.I. to meet he gave de facto recognition to them. Whether unwittingly or by design, the minister advanced the unrest and thrust one group forward, the F.O.I., who would fill a power vacuum on October 25 with drastic consequences.

During 1989, many changes were introduced into the institution. Staff had become

¹See Appendix A for statistics on RHU placement

²See Appendix A for analysis of these factors.

confused over frequent policy changes, sometimes to the point of not knowing how to respond to certain situations. Other staff also were unaware of what certain policies were. The more fundamental difficulty was that because of the confusion, staff could not interpret and explain things to inmates and thus neither knew what the expectations were in certain situations. In rapid order, Camp Hill put in a new grievance procedure, had to deal with policies on asbestos abatement, fire safety and hazardous materials, convert to a contractual medical care system, release their AIDS patients into population, started accreditation work, revised RHU policies several times and converted E Ward into a Parole Violator Unit (thus uniting one large discontented group). Both staff and inmates were being subjected to constantly shifting policies and procedures, adding another stressor.

A great deal of work had been done on Camp Hill's physical plant - a new perimeter security system was installed, a dispensary had been renovated, and individual exercise units were placed in the RHU. What was to become problematic, however, was the antiquated locking system on the wards, the existence of wooden doors that could be easily breached, and the cutting of bars for the placement of air conditioners.

None of these factors - overcrowding, inexperienced staff, wide spread morale, communication and decision making problems, stressed staff and inmates, reduced supervision of staff and inmates, militant groups, and faulty physical plant - need to have led to a full scale disturbance, but Camp Hill would have a string of events that along with the already existing factors would lead to the riot.

ANALYSIS OF THE DISTURBANCE

It is difficult to critique the handling of this disturbance because things as usual are much clearer after the fact than they were before. In many instances, staff acted selflessly and heroically, often on their own, to handle difficult situations. As disastrous as the riot was, it is little short of miraculous that no human life was lost. However, there are certain areas that could have been addressed that certainly might have tempered or better controlled the incredible violent inmate response.

The two policies, one on medical and one on family visits, united the inmates with one common grievance. The sick line policy should never have been issued in the first place since it was against department directives. The family day situation could have been finessed by releasing it later or by releasing it in such a way that the inmates could have understood that they were actually gaining one visit per year. One of the additional difficulties is that staff were not briefed enough to explain these policy changes to inmates and thus could not halt the rumor mill.

Staff at Camp Hill had made several attempts to deal with the F.O.I. This group seized an opportunity of wide inmate unrest and used their well-learned organizational skills and military style to seize control of the events and dictate actions to other inmates. In retrospect, these men, particularly the chief negotiator, could have been placed in custody at an earlier date. The administration at Camp Hill probably could not have predicted the link of the F.O.I. with the general unrest, because there were not long-term indicators of this and because they did not think the F.O.I. was capable of assuming such a large leadership role among general population. However, when inmate leaders start emerging to agitate other inmates, they should be separated by placement in restricted housing.

During the three or four days prior to the disturbance, there were a lot of rumors and unhappiness in general population and the inmates were looking for answers. At this time, the blocks should have been saturated with staff, both custodial and treatment, to explain the policies, stop the rumors, and generally assure the inmates that matters would be worked out and that staff was in control. However, there was no intervention here, and without staff to do the interpreting, the F.O.I. and other Muslims seized the opportunity to explain the policies in their own version.

At the beginning of the disturbance, quick and appropriate responses were taken. However, when the emergency plan was activated, a few problems became evident. One was that not all off-duty people were called, and so several staff members heard about the disturbance over radio and TV and from friends and came in on their own. Another is that certain departments, like kitchen 1, were not alerted at all. These communication problems would crop up throughout the disturbance as would difficulties with the chain-of-command. There were arguments between commissioned officers about whom was in charge, other staff acted independently without direction, and finally some staff even rebelled against orders.

After the inmates were placed into their cells late Wednesday night and early Thursday, several critical decisions were made that would set the scene for the

Thursday evening disturbance. One was to have the State Police removed from the institution at 9:15 a.m. and reduced to a force of 25 troopers who arrived at the Manor House at 9:00 a.m. This decision was made by the superintendent. The other decision was to not shake down the cells and search the inmates during the following day. The third and final problem was a decision that was never really made to make sure that the cells, especially in Group 2 and 3 were secured and incapable of being opened by the inmates. It was evident from the evening before to many staff members that inmates could exit their cells by reaching up and undoing the latch to the locking mechanism above their cell door. They were able to do this because the panel box covers, which secured the locking mechanisms, had been removed in numerous instances.

One of the reasons why staff did not hold the State Police force in the institution and shake down the inmates was due to the suspected physical and mental state of those personnel who were involved. They were fatigued, both physically and emotionally, and were in shock because many staff did not believe what had happened and they had seen fellow officers brutalized. They also thought, erroneously, that the inmates had given up and had exhausted themselves. Thus, the assumption was made that after a hard-fought battle, the staff had won and the inmates had surrendered totally.

A second reason for the inattention to these security details was that it had already been announced through the press that the institution was under control. During the disturbance, staff felt under a lot of pressure to report that the inmates were secured and that no one had escaped to threaten the surrounding community. Staff were in a rush to assure the public that all was under control and secure. Therefore, concern with the press may have influenced decisions.

A third difficulty was that the communication problems that had plagued Camp Hill for some time were repeated during the disturbance. Several staff said they made verbal reports about the situation, others just assumed someone was handling the problem; administrative staff denied getting specific information that the inmates could escape; and as is often true in these confusing and tense situations it is difficult to unravel just who said what to whom. What is evident is the long-standing problem of not getting clear communications up the chain-of-command resurfaced. To begin with, the message on late Wednesday evening was misinterpreted by administration. The ranking correctional officers had reported the inmates as being secure, but what they meant was that everyone was in their cells and off the fields. At that point in time they actually thought that they had the inmates under control because they were in cells that were actually locked but which could later be compromised. Another factor here is that administrative staff thought the difficulties were being taken care of when padlocks were sent to the blocks and maintenance men sent to evaluate and make repairs on the locking mechanisms. Thus somehow the clear message never got through that the security of the cell blocks could easily be breached.

A decision was made to delay any general shakedown because of staff fatigue and because there was some fear that it would provoke the inmates or that staff might retaliate upon inmates. The top administration based this analysis on the 1983 and 1987 problems where staff had assaulted inmates and were later disciplined. What this ignores is that staff from other institutions and State Police could have been brought into the institution to perform these duties. Also, not searching the inmates and their cells, and certainly feeding them, gave the inmates the wrong message of tolerance and lack of control instead of showing

them that there would be a heavier staff response.

What needed to be done was for the Pennsylvania State Police to provide a security force while officers from other institutions were brought in to do the shakedown and secure the inmates while the cell locks were evaluated and repaired.

Policy dictates that administration not become involved in negotiations with inmates as there are established teams that are trained to handle this. However, the Deputy for Treatment had inadvertently become involved with the inmate on the radio and had been successful in releasing some hostages, and he was then excused from the administrative process. The next evening he properly removed himself from the negotiations and became a forward observer from the Highway Tower, which did give the Command Center up-to-date and vital information. However, he should probably have remained with administrative duties in the Command Center and delegated that assignment.

One problem with the negotiations was that by Thursday at 1:00 p.m. these inmates were all Muslim and were not representative of the general population. Therefore, their agenda was different from the concerns of the rest of the inmates. Their interest was in power, disruption and attention getting, rather than coming to any kind of solution. The Thursday negotiations needed to be done with an eye toward future disturbances and because an agreement had been made. However, had the institution been secured, staff could have moved to a more representative group of inmates and isolated those who were interested in fame instead of peace.

The assault by Pennsylvania State Police and indeed the overall attack plan was well thought out and well handled. Even though there were hostages involved, the hostage takers had incomplete control of the area and inmates were running wild, so the administration had no choice but to try to bring a quick and effective end to the situation.

There were other problems with the handling of the disturbance:

1. A staging area where arriving staff were briefed before they went into action was never set up.
2. A manpower coordinator was needed to keep track of SCI Camp Hill staff as well as those arriving from other institutions.
3. Command post was in a vulnerable area inside.

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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Department of Corrections
December 7, 1989

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: David S. Owens, Jr.
Commissioner

FROM: Investigative Committee
Santo Samuel Andolina, C.O. IV *Santo Samuel Andolina*
Kenneth Kyler, C.O. IV *Kenneth Kyler*
James Wilson, C.O. IV *James Wilson*
John McCullough, DOT *John McCullough*

We think that you should be aware of the following areas:

1. We do not think that any one individual was responsible for the disturbance and that from our many interviews we do not think anybody acted maliciously or intentionally disobeyed orders or disregarded information. There are a series of errors that were made, some beginning well before the disturbance, which we have outlined in our more lengthy report.
2. We do think you should know that there are some severe problems with the upper management in the institution. The superintendent had removed himself to the extent that he really was not being given the information he should have. He also failed to control his two deputy superintendents, who made decisions that should have been made by him. During the disturbance, the superintendent made the following critical decisions.
 - A. He decided to remove the Pennsylvania State Police from the institution. The force inside the institution was relieved at 9:00 a.m. and a new group of 25 were placed at the Manor House at 9:15 a.m. on Thursday morning, October 26, 1989. He made this decision to remove the police because he was under the erroneous impression that the institution was secure. In our interview with him, we believe that he was sincere and that he was making what he felt was the correct decision, but unfortunately he did not have all the facts. Another reflection upon him, however, is that on two occasions on Thursday, October 26th, he took tours of the grounds with the institutional maintenance services manager, Mr. Chubb, and both times Mr. Chubb suggested that the superintendent go through the Group 2 and 3 blocks, but he refused to do so. He therefore, did not pursue information very aggressively.
 - B. The superintendent never realized or fully appreciated that the locking mechanisms were ineffective. There is absolutely no trail, either verbal or in writing, to him that would make him conclude that any inmates could escape from their cells.

- C. Several lieutenants and captains mentioned that during a commissioned officers' meeting, the superintendent stated that if they made a mistake and got themselves on a limb, they'd be cut off.
3. Both deputy superintendents have built up an incredible amount of ill-will in this institution and during our interviews, it was apparent that the staff was far more angry at them than at the inmates. They by-passed the chain-of-command several times, and specifically the deputy for operations would not deal with the I.M.S. manager but with his assistant, by-passed the major and went to captains, and with the captains he did not like, he went to the lieutenants. Deputy Henry intimidated those people beneath him and also gave orders beyond the chain-of-command and even went into the custody ranks at the lieutenant and captain levels to give orders without going through the major or even Deputy Smith. He was also giving maintenance personnel direct orders. One particular instance with him stands out in which during a soft ball game a few years ago he countermanded the orders of a shift commander in front of inmates and other staff to continue the game when the shift commander felt that there was a security risk because it was getting dark. This specific incident was mentioned many times by those we interviewed. As a result of this conflict, the shift commander, Captain Stottlemeyer was moved to another shift.
 4. The word most frequently used to describe the major was that he was a "puppet" or a "figurehead". In our interview with him, he knew less than any other employee about what was happening during the disturbance. Because of the pressure that had been applied to the major, he made the unfortunate decision to side with commissioned officers against Deputy Smith. This ended up in a lengthy disciplinary memo being given to the major outlining his faults. Neither the deputy nor the people below the major have much confidence in him, and he at this time is a weak manager.
 5. Continuing down the line, there is a split in the captain ranks that is quite open with one group against the other. We see the lieutenants role as that of passivity as they both tempt to avoid criticism from above and responsibility for those below. From our interviews with sergeants and C.O.I's, it was rare for them to relate where they had received either very much or very effective supervision from that level.
 6. The biggest dispute is about who is responsible for failing to inform or failing to act upon the damaged locking mechanisms in Group 2 and 3. There is no paper trail that leads to any one person. Basically, we have several people stating that they reported this fact to Deputy Smith. Institutional Maintenance Supervisor Chubb, Captain Kerstetter, Lt. Sundy, all stated they reported this directly to Deputy Smith. Also Lt. Sundy, Captain Stottlemeyer and C.O.I Ressler all stated they reported the defects to the major during a tour that the major and Deputy Smith took of the blocks on Thursday. Deputy Smith and the major emphatically deny that anybody told them that all the cell blocks in Group 2 and 3 were not secure.

From our interviews with Deputy Smith, it seems to us very unlikely that a person with his energy level, security consciousness and attention to detail would ignore critical information. It is interesting in the written and verbal reports that were given him was information that certain cell's locking mechanisms were broken. He was also told that they were securing padlocks and clamps to secure those cells which were broken. At no time was he ever told emphatically that the cells were in such bad shape that all inmates could effect an escape from their cells. He thought the problem was with a limited number of cells, and that they were repaired. We think what happened here was that the information was misinterpreted and also poorly conveyed.

7. The question also comes up as to why Deputy Henry became involved in the negotiations and then became a forward observer in the tower. We would like to state that this was his style to run in and take control even from his subordinates, and people on the negotiating team Wednesday night were unhappy that he took over their role. Because he was one of the first to make initial contact with the inmate, and because he did help secure the release of two hostages and also got the approval of the superintendent to enter negotiations and remove himself from the decision-making process, we see this decision as understandable but not desirable. However, the second night he should have been in the Command Center instead of posted in the Highway Tower.

Deputy Henry was given permission by the superintendent to enter into negotiations on Wednesday evening. During the talks, he made agreements with the inmates that were not cleared. Specifically he wrote the following statement for the negotiations: "In the future when a major policy change is to be implemented, we will confer with inmates regarding the need for the change and to solicit the inmates' input."

8. The decision not to have a shakedown was made by the superintendent after consultation with Deputy Smith. The idea was to search the entire facility on Friday or Saturday, after allowing staff to calm down. It should be noted that all these decisions were made without the critical information that the cellblocks in Group 2 and 3 were not secure.



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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Department of Corrections
December 14, 1989

SUBJECT: Further Recommendations on Camp Hill

TO: David S. Owens, Jr
Commissioner

FROM: Santo Samuel Andolina, Captain
Kenneth D. Kyler, Captain
James H. Wilson, Captain
John M. McCullough, Director of Treatment

Santo S. Andolina
K. D. Kyler
James H. Wilson
John M. McCullough

Please find attached the final special investigative report. We have not disseminated this, but Ms. Labecki will await your instructions as to the amount and distribution of any copies.

For your information alone, we have also attached a list of staff whom we interviewed in the Department building. This does not include the inmates and staff we saw at Camp Hill institution.

We also mailed a copy of our recommendations with a cover letter to the union representatives, which is attached.

We have further specific recommendations:

1. On Friday, October 27, 1989 an inmate disguised as a corrections maintenance employee (khaki uniform) was discovered in the plumbing shop. It is believed he broke out of his cell and disguised himself. It should be brought to the attention of all staff that they must positively identify all support employees from other institutions so that inmates can be distinguished from staff. Also, all staff must wear a photo I.D.
2. In the RHU at Camp Hill an inmate broke off a leg from his metal desk console in the cell and used it to break out. Other institutions should be alerted that RHU cell furniture can be altered to make tools and weapons. Three other inmates also broke out of their cells at Camp Hill, probably using the same means. It appears that the metal legs were just spot-welded on. One possible solution may be a gusset brace, which strengthens the structure, and completely bead-weld around the top of the leg.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inmate Investigative Interviews conducted by Lt. Shipley
Copies of incident reports filed following disturbance
R. J. Langland Memo - November 3, 1989
Security Memo by Phyllis A. Herald - March 8, 1989
Corrections Officer Vacancy Report by Robert Freeman October 20, 1989 Budget
Requests by Robert Freeman - September 28, 1989
Sergeants Meeting by Captain D. Bowser/Captain R.L. Keith - August 6, 1989
Dissemination of Information Form - November 25, 1989
SCI-Camp Hill, Daily Search Assignment Form - various
Daily Roster Assignments
Misconduct Report #261706 - October 17, 1989
D. L. Kelchner Report
SCIC Disturbance Wednesday, October 25, 1989 by John Stover - November 27, 1989
Program Review Committee Schedule
Riot Memo - Lt. S. Sunday - November 24, 1989
After Action Report 1989 Riot SCI Camp Hill, C.O. Griffith
Actual Radio Transmissions - October 25, 1989
Family Day Visits by Robert Freeman - October 15, 1989
Procedures for Screening Sick Lines and Medication Lines by Terry Henry
October 11, 1989
C.O. II Baker Incident Report
Disturbance at SCI Camp Hill by Terry Henry - October 31, 1989
SCI Camp Hill Riots by Richard C. Smith - November 6, 1989
SCI Camp Hill, Staff Disciplinary History by Richard C. Smith - Dec. 3, 1989
Shi'a Muslim Community at SCIC memo - October 10, 1989
Quadir Sabir by Lt. G. Sherack - October 17, 1989
Quadir Sabir Muslim Chaplain by R. C. Smith - November 9, 1989
Chaplain Sabir by Jeffrey A Beard - November 28, 1989
SCI Camp Hill Events Leading up to the October 25-26, Riots by R. C. Smith
November 12, 1989
Crowding at Camp Hill - Current Status by Robert Freeman - September 11, 1989
Riot #1 October 25, 1989 by Lt.G. Sherack - November 17, 1989
Riot #2 - October 26, 1989 by Lt. G. Sherack - November 27, 1989
Council AFSCME Corrections Employees Update - November 20, 1989
Union/Management Meet and Discuss Session - October 19, 1989
Labor Management Meeting November 7, 1989
Administrative Staff Meeting - October 16, 1989
Administrative Staff Meeting - October 23, 1989
A Statement on the Impact of Recent Riots on Members of AFSCME Local 2495 -
November 20, 1989
Replacement of Firearms at SCI Camp Hill February 11, 1987 Input by Glen Jeffes
February 13, 1987
Size III Institution Defensive Weapons and Equipment Inventory Guidelines by
David S. Owens, Jr. - April 10, 1989

Dennis Spangler, C.O. I
Mark Grove, C.O. I
Richard Dayton, I.P.S.M.
Dennis Jenkins, C.O. I
Robert Spirk, PSA
Robert Freeman, Superintendent
George Sherack, C.O. III
Robert Joppy, Tradesman Instructor
Julio Davila, C.O. Trainee
Daniel Bowman, Labor Foreman
Robert Stottlemeyer, C.O. IV
Lt. Spells
Robert Rhoades, C.O. I
Sgt. Haley
Rick Shultz, C.O. I
Sgt. Vilott
C.O. I Bowman
Stanley Smith, IMS
Lt. Shipley
Cindy Fitzingo, Administrative Assistant
Lt. Gavigan

